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PUBLIC BROADCASTING
AND THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT
INFLUENCE: TOWARDS A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION
Oscar G. Chase*

The story is told that when Fiorello H. La Guardia was running New
York City he decided, in the face of a tax base eroded by the Depression,
to support continued funding for WNYC, New York's municipally owned
radio system. Accepting the thanks of the station's leadership, the Mayor
said:
Maestro, we're gonna keep that damn old radio station, and
you're on the right track with that good music. Leave jazz to the
other stations. I don't want any hot stuff.1
Even the Mayor's recognizable touch of grace could not disguise the
presence of a principle which haunts publicly funded broadcasting: government control follows its funds.
Nonetheless, the alternative, commercial control, has itself been subject
to such severe limitations that government funding has not lacked enthusiastic advocates. Among these advocates was the Carnegie Commission on
Educational Television, whose report, Public Television, A Program for
Action, 2 provided much of the impetus for the adoption of the Public
Broadcasting Act of 19673 under which was established the American
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1960, New York University;
J.D., 1963, Yale University.
The author is one of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Network Project v. Corporation for Public Broadcasting, 398 F. Supp. 1332 (D.D.C. 1975), an action in which
the plaintiffs have alleged illegal and unconstitutional attempts by the defendants
to control the content of public television broadcasting and have sought injunctive,
monetary, and declaratory relief. (Motions to dismis3 the action on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction and mootness were granted by the district court in an opinion
and order filed July 23, 1975. Plaintiffs have appealed.)
The research assistance of Arnold Bartfeld, J.D., 1974, Brooklyn Law School,
and Nancy Burton, a student at Brooklyn Law School, is gratefully acknowledged.
Sincere appreciation is also due to the members of the Network Project for sharing
their many insights into the American public broadcasting system.
1 N.Y. Times, July 9, 1974, at 39, col. 6.
2 The Carnegie Commission on Educational Television was created pursuant to a
grant from the Carnegie Corporation in order to study the development of noncommercial television in the United States. Its report and recommendations were
published under this title. CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION, PUBLIC TELEVISION, A PROGRAM FOR ACTION (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
3 47 U.S.C. § 390 et seq. (1970). See generally text accompanying notes 52-109
infra.
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system of public broadcasting 4 as it now exists. Although aware of the
dangers of government involvement, the Commission was decidedly optimistic about the possibilities of the new medium:
If we were to sum up our proposal with all the brevity at our
command, we would say that what we recommend is freedom.
We seek freedom from the constraints, however necessary in
their context, of commercial television .... We seek for the artist,
the technician, the journalist, the scholar, and the public servant
freedom to create, freedom to innovate, freedom to be heard in
this most far-reaching medium. We seek for the citizen freedom
to view, to see programs that the present system, by its incompleteness, denies him. 5
Unfortunately, the Commission's vision has not been realized. Partly
because the Congress did not adopt all of the safeguards recommended by
the Commission,6 partly because of the centralized infrastructure established by the administrators of public broadcasting funds,7 partly because
of pressure applied by government officials, 8 and partly because of niggardly funding, 9 the federal government has had far more influence than
is desirable.
This article will explore the problems raised by the emergence of the
federal government as a television "sponsor." It will argue that fundamental structural reform is needed to promote the constitutional values at
issue, that such reform will also promote the interests of local control
sought by the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, and that legislative action
in furtherance of this structural solution is desirable. 10 In this context this
4 The term "public broadcasting" is not defined in the Act, although it does define
"noncommercial educational broadcast station:"
(7) The term 'noncommercial educational broadcast station' means a
television or radio broadcast station, which (A) under the rules and
regulations of the Federal Communications Commission in effect on
the date of enactment of the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967, is eligible
to be licensed or is licensed by the Commission as a noncommercial
educational radio or television broadcast station and which is owned
and operated by a public agency or nonprofit private foundation,
corporation, or association or (B) is owned and operated by a municipality and which transmits only noncommercial programs for educational purposes.
47 U.S.C. § 397(7) (1970).
For the purposes of this article the term "public broadcasting" will mean the
broadcasting done by such stations. While the term includes radio as well as television broadcasting, we are here concerned with the latter only. The abbreviation
"ptv" will be used for public television broadcasting.
See also text accompanying note 20 infra.

5 REPORT,

supra note 2, at 98-99.

6 See text accompanying notes 67-74, 94-100 infra.
7 See text accompanying notes 101-60 infra.
8 See text accompanying notes 161-201 infra.
9 See text accompanying notes 94-100, 335-39 inIra.
10 This in no way implies that judicial relief is not authorized on the basis of the
constitutional or statutory claims which can be made by appropriate plaintiffs. Congressional action is desirable despite the possible intervention of the courts because,
first, litigation is subject to protracted delay and, second, the outcome of the litigation
could be affected by factors unrelated to the merits, such as standing or jurisdictional
problems. In short, Congress has its own responsibility for the system it created.
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article will consider the proposed Public Broadcasting Financing Act of
197411 and will argue that any bill modeled on it would not eliminate the
problems despite its salutary innovations. Not considered, except by implication, is the parallel national public radio structure, 12 the use of public
money for television by the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare 13 or the somewhat remote issues raised by activities of the
14
National Endowment for the Arts.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC
TELEVISION SYSTEM

Although the Carnegie Commission has been credited with originating
the term "public television," 15 there were already 124 "educational" television stations in existence at the time of the Commission's report, that is, stations owned and operated by nonprofit organizations, such as educational
institutions, which did not carry advertising. The licensees fell into four general categories: systems serving elementary and secondary schools, state
universities, and nonagencies such as state boards of education, public
16
profit corporations serving various municipalities.
Not all of the programming broadcast by these educational stations was,
in the Commission's view, "public" television, for it distinguished that concept from "instructional" television.' 7 This distinction played a major part

11 S. 3825, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See Hearings on S. 3825 Before the Subconmm. on Communications oj the Senate Conmerce Commnn., 93d Cong., 2d Sess.,
ser. 97 (1974) [hereinaftercited as 1974 Senate Hearings]. The bill was not enacted.
Nonetheless, because its basic structure was endorsed by the administration and
by a broad segment of public broadcasting officials, the bill has served as a model for
others. In recent oversight hearings held by the House Subcommittee on Communications, the 1974 Act was implicitly adopted as a basis for discussion. Hearings Before the Subcomnmn. on Communications of the House Commn. on Interstate & Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The Public Broadcasting Financing Act
of 1975, H.R. 4563, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), is essentially a reintroduction of
the 1974 Act. See Hearings on H.R. 4563 Before the Subcoinmn. on Comnnunication
of the House Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commnerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
34 (1975).
12 The Act also established a national public radio system. 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1970).
13 See REPORT, supra note 2, at 24. According to the Carnegie Commission, television programming has also been produced by the Departments of Defense and
Health, Education and Welfare and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
14 The Endowment provides federal funds to assist the arts. 20 U.S.C. § 954
(Supp. 1974).
15 F. POWLEDGE, PUBLIC TELEVISION: A QUESTION OF SURVIVAL (A REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION) 5 (1972).
16 REPORT, supra note 2, at 21-22. Sui generis,

as a municipal licensee, was the
City of New York (WNYC-TV). Id. at 22.
17 The Carnegie Commission reported that it had
separated educational television into two parts: (1) instructional television, directed at students in the classroom or otherwise in the general
context of formal education, and (2) what we shall call Public Television which is directed at the general community. . . . [It] includes
all that is of human interest and importance which is not at the
moment appropriate or available for support by advertising, and which
is not arranged for formal instruction.
Id. at 1.
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in the Commission's recommendations. Before passing to the plan put
forth by the Commission, however, three problem areas which helped to
shape the plan and which are still of concern should be noted: funding,
program sources, and interstation program distribution facilities.
Funds for these stations came primarily from state and local governments, with lesser amounts from the Ford Foundation, public contributions,
and corporate underwriters.1 s The federal government also provided
financial aid, for technical facilities only, pursuant to the Educational
Television Facilities Act of 1962.19 Although funding sources were diverse,
available were grossly insufficient
in the Commission's view the total funds
20
to meet public broadcasting's needs.
Programming sources are important not only because it is, after all, what
appears on the screen that matters most to the viewing public but also because assured wide range distribution of a tv program results in a flow of
power to the program's creators. The primary source of ptv programming
was National Educational Television (NET), a nongovernmental agency
established with Ford Foundation support. 21 Almost half of an "average"
22
ptv station's entire programming in 1966 was contracted for by NET..
Other programs were locally produced, 23 and these programs were frequently exchanged among the stations. 24 Still other programs were obtained
from federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, NASA, and
25
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
Exchange of programming among the stations was limited by the
primitive distribution facilities then in use. Most stations could obtain a
program only if a video tape copy was physically delivered to them. A far
more efficient alternative was the use of an electronic interconnection, 26
which enabled simultaneous transmission of a program to as many stations
18 Id. at 27-28. Of a total of $60 million available to all stations in 1965-66, state
and local governments provided $33.5 million, the federal government $7 million,
the Ford Foundation $8.5 million, individual contributors $3 million, and corporations $2 million.
19 47 U.S.C. § 390 et seq. (1970). Funds are provided through the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare.
20 The Carnegie Commission estimated the annual cost of an adequate ptv system
would be $178 million initially, rising to $270 million by 1980 as anticipated expansion occurred. REPORT, supra note 2, at 76-77, 135-91. The total ptv budget (including income from all sources) in fiscal 1972 was $166.8 million. 1973 CPB ANN.
REP. 22. This sum has proven insufficient to accomplish the goals set by the Commission. See notes 94-100, 335-39 and accompanying text inira.
21 The bulk of NET's funds came from the Fund for Adult Education, itself
financed largely by the Ford Foundation. F. POWLEDGE, supra note 15, at 3. See also
REPORT, supra note 2, at 23-24. The Ford Foundation's large role in the funding of
the early educational tv system, coupled with its active interest in the medium, led
one study to conclude that by 1961 "Ford ... had direct and practically total control over 'educational' television in America." THE NETWORK PROJECT, THE FOURTH

(1971) [hereinafter cited as

NETWORK
22 REPORT, supra
23 Id. at 24.

24
25

THE FOURTH NETWORK].

note 2, at 23-24.

Id.
Id.

26 For a discussion of the electronic interconnection, see notes 129-60 and accompanying text infra.
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as were linked to the system. Receiving stations could either broadcast the
material as it came in or tape it for later use. Although such systems were
then in use by the commercial networks they were too expensive for most
27
educational tv use given the funds then available.
The Commission concluded that a well-financed and welldirected educational television system, substantially larger and
far more pervasive and effective than that which now exists in the
United States, must be brought into
28 being if the full needs of the
American public are to be served.
The "needs" to be met were not those pragmatic ends which could be
served by instructional tv but rather the "public" spiritual, cultural, and
political needs, which, the Commission thought, were within the reach of
the technology of television but which could not be met by television as a
commercial institution.29 Public television could reflect the diversity of
America, not only in the cultural sense but in the geographic as well, by
reflecting the views of the communities served by the stations.30 The
medium could, in the ultimate analysis, serve nothing less than "freedom."'
The Commission argued that freedom could be served only if funds were
sufficient to ensure that local stations were well-equipped technically32 and
were provided with "such abundant programming as to offer . . . both
diversity and choice. ' 33 Since the costs projected were beyond reach without
federal assistance 34 the Commission had to face the effect of consequent
federal control and the problems it raised. The proposed solution was
two-fold: to establish a nonprofit corporation, to be called the Corporation
for Public Television (CPT) which would receive and administer federal
funds; and then to insulate the proposed corporation from the risks of
annual appropriation requests by establishing a tax on the sale of tv sets,
the proceeds of which would be for the sole use of public broadcasting. 35
The new corporation was to be "nongovernmental," 36 not an agency of
the United States but "a freestanding institution, like other nonprofit cor27 REPORT, supra note 2, at 26. An interconnection was, however, used by
eight stations in the Eastern Educational Network. Id. When federal funds became
available under the Act, a national interconnection was established. See text accompanying notes 108-15 infra.

28 REPORT. supra
291d. at 13-16.

note 2, at 3.

I think television should be the visual counterpart of the literary essay,
should arouse our dreams, satisfy our hunger for beauty, take us on
journeys, enable us to participate in events, present great drama and
music, explore the sea and the sky and the woods and the hills. It
should be our Lyceum, our Chatauqua, our Minsky's, and our Camelot.
It should restate and clarify the social dilemma and political pickle.
Id. at 13 (quoting E. B. White).
30 Id. at 14, 33-35.
31 Id. at 98-99. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
32 Id. at 33-35, 74-75.
33 Id. at 87.
34 See note 20 supra. The cost of operating the existing ptv system in 1966 was
approximately $57 million. REPORT, supra note 2, at 241.
35 REPORT,

supra note 2, at 36-41, 68-73.

36ld. at 37-38.
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porations created to serve the public interest. '3 7 Among CPT's broad
powers and responsibilities, it was to disburse funds for program production, 38 to assist in upgrading local stations,3 9 to solicit funds outside of
41
government, 40 to establish an effective national interconnection system,
and in a broad sense to lead the development of a growing public broadcasting system. 42 Although expecting CPT to play a central role in the new
system, the Commission advised that it be secondary to the role of the local
stations, "the bedrock" of ptv. 43 Somehow the amalgam was to be a
"national institution" within which the autonomy of the local entities would
44
be secure.
In recommending the second of its insulators, the excise tax on tv sets,
the Commission argued that relieving ptv of the need to make recurrent
appropriation requests to the government would increase the likelihood of
independence. 45 Though Congress initially rejected the recommendation,
this concern for ptv's independence proved well-founded. In belated
tribute to the Commission's prescience, the proposed Public Broadcasting
Funding Act includes a five year funding provision. 46 However, it is not
47
yet clear whether this will ensure ptv's independence.
II. THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT OF 1967

A. An Outline of the Act
The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 (the Act) consists of three titles:
Title I provides for additional grants for educational broadcasting facilities
and is essentially an extension and amendment of the Educational Television Facilities Act of 1962.48 Grants would continue to be made by the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 49 Title III authorizes HEW
to conduct "a major study of instructional television." 50 Title II establishes
the structure through which, for the first time, federal funds are used for a
system of public television 51 and is of primary concern to our present
inquiry.
37 Id. at 37. Curiously, the Commission proposed that half the members of the
board of directors of this corporation be appointed by the President, certainly compromising its supposed independence from government. Id. The remaining directors
were to be selected by the presidential appointees. Id.
38 Id. at 38. The Commission thought that this should be the "principal responsibility of the Corporation." Id. at 42.
39Id. at 38.
40Id. at 40-41.
41Id. at 38.
42Id. at 36-37, 41.
43 Id. at 36.

44 Id.
451d. at 69.

46S. 3825, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1 (1974).
47 See notes 297-307 and accompanying text infra.
48 47 U.S.C. § 396 (1970).
4947 U.S.C. § 396 (1970).
50 47 U.S.C. § 390 note (1970).
51 47 U.S.C. §§ 390-396 (1970).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 9:62

The imprint of the Carnegie Commission on Title II is unmistakable.
One writer called it an "excellent sample of the usefulness of public-spirited
commissions. ' 52 In the Act's preamble 53 Congress announced that the development of "noncommercial educational radio and television broadcasting" was in the public interest,5 4 that it was appropriate for the federal
government to assist in its development,5 5 that the programming to be
broadcast should be "an expression of diversity and excellence" 56 which
would depend on "freedom, imagination, and initiative ....
,,,57 and finally
that a "private corporation" should be established to develop public broadcasting "and to afford maximum protection to such broacasting from
extraneous interference and control. "58
Under the Act's plan the new corporation, called the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting (CPB) 59 would receive and disburse federal funds in
pursuance of its basic goal: the development of a public broadcasting
system. 60 Some of the specific functions Congress thought CPB would
perform included raising funds, publicizing, making direct grants to public
broadcasting stations, obtaining programs, and establishing an interconnection system. 61 Although CPB was to have broad responsibilities, its powers
were limited. Notably, it was prohibited from owning or operating any
broadcasting, receiving, or production facilities. 62 In short, CPB was
expected to develop and fund the new system and all of its necessary components but not to itself operate or control any part of it.63
52 F. POWLEDGE, supra note 15, at 7. The debt has received official acknowledgement as well. S. REP. No. 222, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1774. See also H.R. REP. No. 572, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1800.
53 47 U.S.C. § 396(a) (1970).
5447 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1) (1970). Although the term "public broadcasting" was used
in the title as well as in the name of the corporation established by the Act, Congress
elsewhere used the term "noncommercial educational radio and television broadcasting." Compare 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1970), with 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1) (1970). There
is no indication that Congress was thus making a less than wholehearted endorsement
of the Commission's view that the nation should move beyond "educational" broadcasting into "public" broadcasting. See notes 15, 17 and accompanying text supra.
The Act also defines "educational television or radio programs" as those "which
are primarily designed for educational or cultural purposes," 47 U.S.C. § 397(9)
(1970). Deleted from the Act in conference was a provision which the House would
have added, "and not primarily for amusement or entertainment purposes." See
CONF. REP. No. 794, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) at 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1834, 1835. In a different sense the Congress went beyond the Commission in
including radio in the expanded public broadcasting package. 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(1)
(1970).
5547 U.S.C. §§ 396(a)(3), (5) (1970).
5647 U.S.C. § 396(a)(4) (1970).
5747
U.S.C. § 396(a)(2) (1970).
5847 U.S.C. § 396(a)(6) (1970).
S947 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1970).
6047 U.S.C. §§ 396(a)(6), (g)(l)(A) (1970).
6147 U.S.C. § 396(g) (1970).
6247 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3) (1970).
63 For example, CPB was expected to "assist in the development" of an interconnection system, 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(B) (1970), but was prohibited from owning or
operating the system it helped establish. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(3) (1970). See text accom-
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CPB was obviously modeled on the Commission's proposed CPT.6
That CPB exists demonstrates congressional concern with the issue of governmental control, as it was intended to serve as the needed buffer between
the government and the broadcasters, producers, and artists destined to
receive the funds. CPB, the Act states, would "not be an agency or
establishment of the United States Government. '65 It was enjoined to
[c]arry out its purposes and engage in its activities in ways that
will most effectively assure the maximum freedom of the noncommercial educational television or radio broadcast systems and
local stations from interference with or control of program content or other activities.66
Yet, when one examines the ,Act in detail it becomes clear that CPB was
far from the independent entity promised. Congress was torn by two
concerns: its desire for a nongovernmental CPB on the one hand and its
unwillingness to yield all control over its creation. Congress sought to
resolve the conflict by proclaiming CPB's autonomy while at the same time
writing controls into the law which assured the corporation's continuing
subjugation.
B. Statutory Limits on CPB Independence
1. Board of Directors-The most striking control compromising CPB's
independence was the power given to the President to appoint the entire
67
fifteen member Board of Directors, subject to confirmation by the Senate.
Three limits were placed on the appointing power which somewhat lessen
its political impact: first, selection standards are described, although in
quite broad terms; 68 second, no more than eight members may be of the
same political party;6 9 and third, the members serve for staggered six-year
panying notes 81-93 infra for an explanation of Congress' motivation in limiting
CPB's power.
64 The variance in the corporate name reflects Congress' desire to include radio
in the new program. See note 54 supra.
65 47 U.S.C. § 396(b) (1970). It was also provided that CPB would be a nonprofit
corporation, 47 U.S.C. § 396(f)(1)(2) (1970), and could not support any political party
or candidate for political office. 47 U.S.C. § 396(f)(3) (1970).
66 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(l)(D) (1970).
How can the Federal Government provide a source of funds to pay part
of the cost of educational broadcasting and not control the final product? That question is answered in the bill by the creation of a nonprofit
educational broadcasting corporation.
Every witness who discussed the operation agreed that funds for
programs should not be provided directly by the Federal Government.
It was generally agreed that a nonprofit Corporation, directed by a
Board of Directors, none of whom will be Government employees,
will provide the most effective insulation from Government control or
influence over the expenditure of funds.
H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1805.
67 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1) (1970).
68 They were to be eminent in cultural or civic affairs, and to be broadly representative of the nation's various regions, professions and occupations. 47 U.S.C.
§ 396(c)(2) (1970).

69 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(1) (1970).
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terms. 70 The fact that all of the members of the Board owe their appointments to the President necessarily threatens the independence of the
corporation. 71 The Carnegie Commission, though allowing some presidential input, would have limited him to naming half the members of a board
73
of twelve. 72 Although this position was favored by the Senate committee
74
its view was not adopted.
2. Auditing and Reporting Requirements-The Act additionally insured
a direct and continuing relationship between CPB and the government by
imposing federal auditing and reporting requirements. CPB is required to
make annual reports to Congress, 75 it is subject to audit by the General
Accounting Office 76 with the results of such audits reported to Congress,
and all recipients of CPB funds are themselves subject to audit by the
77
Comptroller General of the United States.
3. Limits on Freedom in Program Development-The effectiveness of
CPB as a buffer was further limited by congressional attempts to rough out
the dimensions of the programming ultimately to be produced. CPB was
charged with developing a system which would ensure that programs of
"high quality" would be made available to broadcasters. 78 Congress also
required that the programs be "obtained from diverse sources" '79 with
U.S.C. § 396(c)(4) (1970).
The CPB board membership has been criticized for failing to meet the Act's
requirement of "broad representation". 47 U.S.C. § 396(c)(2) (1970). See THE
FOURTH NETWORK, supra note 21, at 27, which charges that it is "weighted .. .
preponderantly in favor of the ruling Establishment" in that its members were "recruited from the highest levels of military, industrial and governmental bureaucracies ... "
It has been alleged that President Nixon's appointees to the Board were chosen
in order to influence CPB programming policy in accordance with the President's
wishes. Friendly, The Campaign to Politicize Broadcasting, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV. 9, 13-14 (1973).
72 REPORT, supra note 2, at 37.
73 S. REP. No. 222, supra note 52, at 1784-85.
74 The House bill, H.R. 6736, provided for the appointment scheme which was
eventually adopted, H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1805.
7547 U.S.C. § 396(i) (1970).
70 47 U.S.C. § 396(l)(2) (1970).
77 47 U.S.C. § 396(l)(3)(B) (1970). In justifying these links to government the Senate Committee said: "Congress must be assured of the Corporation's responsible
management without creating public confusion as to its independence." S. REP. No.
222, supra note 52, at 1778.
7847 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970). Congress could not be faulted for urging
attention to quality, but its treatment of public broadcasting hardly served that
goal. See text accompanying notes 94-100, 334-38 infra. What programming would
constitute "high quality" is unclear. Surely it includes high technical standards, see
S. REP. No. 222, supra note 52, at 1778, but beyond that does it mean "highbrow"
programs, those with mass appeal, or something in between? The Senate Commerce
Committee seemed not entirely sure:
Although the aims of noncommercial broadcasting should be directed
toward cultural and information programs, it should not be so highly
specialized, however, that it caters only to the most esoteric tastes.
Id. at 1777-78. See also note 54 supra and text accompanying notes 121, 134-35 infra.
7947 U.S.C. § 396(g)(l)(A) (1970). The Senate Report mentions national production centers, independent producers and local stations as possible sources of
programs. S. REP. No. 222, supra note 52, at 1778.
7047
71
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"strict adherence to objectivity and balance in all programs and series of
programs of a controversial nature." 80 Plainly these provisions were intended to restrict the ptv system's freedom of operation, but some
restrictions could have been argued to be desirable because they would
promote the freedom of the public broadcasting stations which CPB was
to supply with services, money, and programs. Thus, if programming was
obtained from "diverse sources," as opposed to one or two major production centers, it would be more likely to reflect a greater range of political,
ideological and artistic viewpoints. The local stations, having a greater
selection, could choose to broadcast only those programs which suited
them.
We have already seen that the Act contained safeguards against the
centralization of excessive power in CP181 and that these controls were
prompted by congressional fear that CPB would otherwise come to control

8047 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970). The effect of this provision remains unclear.
CPB has taken the position that it requires of public broadcasters more stringent
neutrality than does the fairness doctrine, in that the latter requires a balanced approach to public issues in the context of a licensee's entire program schedule while
§ 396(g)(1)(A) requires balance in each program funded by CPB. Comments of Corporation for Public Broadcasting In re Jurisdiction of the Commission with Respect
to § 396 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Reply No. 8330-Q,
C9-1317 (April 5, 1973) at 19. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), which operates the ptv interconnection, see text accompanying notes 118-24 infra,
has argued that the "objectivity and balance" requirement is simply a restatement of
the fairness doctrine and imposes no new standards or obligations. Memorandum of
Public Broadcasting Service In re Commission Jurisdiction and Interpretation of
§ 396(g)(l)(A) of the Communications Act of 1934. as amended, Ref. No. 833-Q.
C9-1317 (Mar. 26, 1973) at 11-19 [hereinafter cited as Memorandum]. The legislative history leaves little doubt that the requirement need not be met in every
program so long as the program is part of a series. The balance can be provided in
a subsequent program in the series. CONF. REP. No. 794, supra note 58, at
1835-36. See also 113 CONG. REC. 29386 (1967) (remarks of Representative Staggers).
Even if the statute can be satisfied by an objective series in which some programs
were not objective, it could be read to allow less flexibility than the fairness doctrine
if the word "series" includes only those programs funded by CPB in a specific
grant rather than including all programs broadcast on an issue by a given ptv
station, whether or not funded by CPB. If Congress intended the former interpretation (as the context suggests) it no doubt did so in order to prevent CPB from putting across its own (or a producer's) viewpoint on a controversial issue. See text
accompanying notes 88-93 infra. Insofar as it is thus controlling the speech of the
producer by the threat of withholding government funds the statute raises serious
first amendment problems. In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396
(1969), the Court approved the fairness doctrine but suggested reservations about
further possible government attempts to regulate broadcasting content. See also first
amendment argument made by PBS in Memorandum, supra, at 20-25; cf. Canby, The
First Amendment and the State as Editor: Implications jor Public Broadcasting, 52
TEXAS L. REV. 1123, 1161 (1974).
Recognizing the first amendment problems inherent in enforcement of the "objectivity and balance" provision, it was held in Accuracy in Media v. FCC, 521 F.2d
288 (D.C. Cir. 1975) that the effect of the provision was horatory only, that it is "a
guide to the Congressional oversight policy and . . . a set of goals to which . . .
CPB should aspire." Id. at 297. The court affirmed an FCC ruling that the Commission could not enforce the provision against CPB or a noncommercial station.
81 See notes 62-66 and accompanying text supra.
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the programming of the local stations.82 The prohibition against CPB
owning or operating a "network" is traceable to this fear, 3 since central
control over programming would probably diminish the local nature of the
ptv stations, thus inhibiting their ability to serve their own communities in
ways that commercial stations can or will not.8 4 Indeed, restrictions on
CPB's authority, even those dealing with programming, are arguably proper
so long as they promote freedom of the licensees or the program producers
and so long as CPB is recognized as imbued with state action.8 5 If state
action is involved then protection of the licensees and producers from CPB
is perhaps a matter of constitutional necessity and is, of course, an appropriate goal of legislation.
The requirement that programming be from diverse sources8 6 also seems
defensible, as stations fed nothing but "Eastern liberal" productions might
legitimately feel cabined in, but the objectivity and balance provision87 is
less satisfactory. If the treatment of a given issue is considered unbalanced
by a local station, the station could, of course, simply pass up the program,
but the reach of the provision itself has an obvious chilling effect that could
significantly reduce the artistic freedom of a producer making a program
with CPB funds. When Congress enacted this provision it was responding
to a second major concern about the legislation: the possibility that the
new system might be used to spread ideological views with which many
citizens or legislators disagreed.8 8 Significantly, many legislators who shared
this concern thought that the Act sufficiently safeguarded against the
danger.8 9
82

The Senate Report stated:
We wish to state in the strongest terms possible that it is our intention
that local stations be absolutely free to determine for themselves what
they should or should not broadcast.

S. REP. No. 222, supra note 51, at 1782. See generally Accuracy in Media v. FCC,

521 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83 See note 62 and accompanying text supra. The term "network" was not defined
in the Act. However, H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1809, states that
[l]t is assumed that, in compliance with this prohibition, the Corporation will not have a staff of producers, commentators, announcers, and
others directly associated with program production; a system of fixed
schedule broadcasting; ownership or operative authority over program production equipment, studios, or interconnection facilities; or
station affiliates.
84 The Carnegie Commission stressed the importance of strong local stations because of such concerns. REPORT, supra note 2, at 32-36. The Senate Report also
shared this view, see text accompanying note 91 supra, as did the House Report:
".. . a fundamental concept . . . runs throughout Title I--localism: local stations
shall retain both the opportunity and responsibility for broadcasting programs they
feel best serve their communities." H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1808.
85 For a discussion of the state action problem, see note 208 in/ra.
86 See note 79 supra.
87 See note 80 supra.
88 Witness Senator Thurmond warned, "nothing in this bill safeguards against
the capture of the corporation by a small clique with definite ideological biasses [sic]."
119 CONG. REC. 14515 (1973) (quoted by Senator Helms).
89 The minority report stated:
We know that we are not alone in feeling some misgivings about creating a mechanism for the kind of broadcasting which might result from
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Further evidence that the Act sought to discourage controversy in programming is its explicit prohibition of editorializing. Congress reached
past its supposed buffer to the ptv stations themselves by providing that
"[n]o noncommercial educational broadcasting may engage in editorializing
or may support or oppose any candidate for political office."90 By "editorializing" the Act meant the broadcast of positions taken by station
management. 91 Stations were free to broadcast programs in which views
were espoused, so long as the "editorial" format was not used. By contrast,
commercial stations are permitted to express "editorial" opinions so long
92
as an opportunity to reply is given to persons of differing views.
In narrowing, even slightly, the range of programming options the new
system could exercise, Congress retreated from the bold outlines of the
Act's preamble, betraying the early advocates of a free, unfettered
medium 93 in deference to a political expediency born of caution.
4. Inadequate Funding-The most harmful congressional departure
from the Carnegie Commission's plan was the failure to insure adequate
long range funding outside the normal annual appropriation process.
Despite the Commission's warnings against such a provision, the Act contained only a one-year funding authorization in the amount of only nine
million dollars. 94 This was explained on the ground that it was impossible
to predict in advance either the actual financial needs of the system or the
amounts it would be able to raise from nonfederal sources. 95 Additional
reasons were uncertainty as to the composition of the CPB Board and its
"operational policies." Until the Public Broadcasting Act of 197496 was
introduced no long range funding proposal was adopted or even seriously
considered by Congress. Annual appropriations were the rule until 1973,
when a two-year funding bill was adopted. 97 Indeed, the Commission's
fears were realized in a series of attempts by the Executive to use its control
over funds to influence the conduct of the ptv system. These attempts
reached even to program content. 98
Adoption of the normal appropriation process for public broadcasting
badly served the goal of freedom from government interference in public
ambitions such as these. It is not the gist of our complaint with the
bill, however. The committee has worked very hard to devise and incorporate safeguards ....

[W]e feel that the committee version of the

Corporation, with the caveats and policy statements applicable thereto,
can be workable.
Minority views of Reps. Broyhill, Hawey, Watson, Carter and Brown, H.R. REP. No.
572, supra note 52, at 1832.
9047 U.S.C. § 399 (1970).
91 H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1810; CONF. REP. No. 794, supra note 54,
at 1835.
92 47 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1973); 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1257 (Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees).
93 See text accompanying notes 5, 23-31 supra.
94 47 U.S.C. § 396(k)(1) (1970).
95 H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1811-12.
96S. 3825, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
97 47 U.S.C. § 391 (Supp. 1974).

98 See text accompanying notes 178-207 infra.
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broadcasting, but so too did the penurious amounts appropriated. Though
the annual appropriation was increased to $50 million in 1974 and $60
million in 1975, 99 the funding level has not approached that suggested by
the Commission. 100 Ironically, the result has been an augmentation of
CPB's power in relation to the ptv licensees, whose freedom has accordingly been diminished. In part, this is because a lack of funds has meant that
few programs can be funded, thereby reducing the range from which the
licensees could select. Lack of funds has also deprived the system of the
technical equipment which is necessary to allow the licensees to broadcast
on independently determined schedules. Exactly how this works will be
made clear in the following section.
Il1.

POWER AND ITS ABUSE

At this point, the endeavor to establish freedom of expression in
noncommercial broadcasting must be deemed a failure. 10 1
This was the judgment in 1972 by John W. Macy, the first President of
CPB. From his vantage point the cause of the failure was executive branch
interference with the ptv system.' 02 The blame for it may also be traced to
the structure within which ptv is operated by the Public Broadcasting
Service (PBS). 103 Together, these organizations largely determine what
programs shall be produced for ptv and by whom; 10 4 they decide what
programs shall be distributed to the ptv licensees; 10 5 they decide what the
distribution schedule shall be; 10 6 they can and do preview every finished
program prior to its distribution. °7 Because both CPB and PBS are subject
to close control by the federal government, the centralization of power in
these agencies has been an important factor in the failing effort to keep ptv
independent of government.
A. The Concentrationof Power Under
Current Organization of the PTV System
Although, as the predominant organization in the ptv system, CPB has
already been discussed, 108 no understanding of the system is complete
which does not also take into account CPB's creation and "partner", 10 9
99 47 U.S.C. § 391 (Supp. 1974).
100 See notes 20, 34 supra.
101 John Macy, former President of the CPB, quoted in H. ASHMORE, FEAR IN THE
AIR 95 (1973).
102 Id. at 94-95.
103 See text accompanying notes 108-15 inira for a description of PBS.
104 See text accompanying notes 116-28 infra.
105 See text accompanying notes 129-35 infra.
106 See text accompanying note 130 infra.
107 See text accompanying notes 135-60 infra.
108 See text accompanying notes 58-93 supra.
109 CPB and PBS in 1973 executed a "partnership agreement" in which they described their shared authority over the ptv system. A Joint Resolution of CPB and
PBS, 1973 CPB ANN. REP. 8-9.
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PBS, which shares considerable general authority with its parent and exercises even more day-to-day decision-making power. PBS was organized by
CPB in 1969 pursuant to its authority under the Act to create a system of
interconnection," as a means of delivering programs to ptv stations which
desire them."' This is physically accomplished by transmitting the programs electronically to the stations in some cases via facilities leased from
AT&T. 1 12 Stations receiving these programs may broadcast them directly
as they come in, tape them for broadcast at a later date if they have technical capability, or decide not to broadcast them at all.'18 Later, in 1973,
PBS underwent a substantial reorganization and became, in addition to the
manager of the interconnection, the representative body of the ptv stations,
114
who now comprise its membership and elect its Board of Governors.
Though nominally independent and self-governing, PBS may be subject to
influence by CPB, primarily because most of PBS funds are provided by
CPB.115
1. Program Production-Programsare produced for public television
with funds obtained from federal as well as several nonfederal sources such
as charitable foundations and corporations. 116 Since the Act itself does not
mandate the use of program production funds for any specific purpose,
CPB has largely been free to decide how much to spend for programming
and how to spend it. As CPB has traditionally budgeted its funds, program
money has been allocated in two ways: through direct grants from CPB to
producers whose productions are intended for national ptv distribution and
through grants from CPB to ptv licensees which the latter may use for local7
productions not intended (but not barred from) national distribution."1
Authority to allocate national program production funds rests primarily
with CPB, 118 but it is obligated to "consult" with PBS. 119 In the event of
110 Statement of Hartford N. Gunn, Jr., President, PBS, Hearings on S. 1090,
S. 1228 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Com-

merce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 145 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]. See 47
U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(B) (1970).
111 H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1808-09.
Membership Corporation, A Background Paper, 1973
112 PBS-A Licensee
Hearings,supra note 110, at 478-79.
113 id.
114 PBS BY-LAws § 5.4 (March 30, 1973). In 1973 there were 238 ptv stations.
1973 CPB ANN. REP., supra note 109, at 19.

115 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 69. Subsequent to its 1973 reorganization,

PBS became a dues paying organization with each station obliged to pay annual
dues. The stations' expected source of the dues, however, are funds provided by
CPB in the form of "Community Service Grants." BROADCASTING, Nov. 19, 1973, at
30; id. Oct. 1, 1973. See note 326 and accompanying text infra.
116 1973 CPB ANN. REP., supra note 109, at 23.
117 Testimony of Thomas B. Curtis, Chairman, CPB, 1973 Hearings, supra note
110, at 14, 16. In fiscal year 1973, $15 million was allocated for national radio and
tv programming. Id. at 14. Although grants to local radio and tv stations ("Community Service Grants") were $6.6 million, or 18 percent of CPB's federal funds, id.
at 16, 65, not all of the local tv station funds would actually be used for program
production. Id. at 16.
118 Joint Resolution, supra note 109, at para. 1.
119 Id.
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disagreement between CPB and PBS staff, resolution is by "appeal" to the
120
respective chairmen of the two organizations.
The philosophy which generally guides CPB in choosing which programs
to fund is that
[t]he mission of public broadcasting is to meet the special
audiences; those with great interest in public affairs, children, the
aged, racial
minorities, drama lovers, the undereducated, the
21
erudite.'
Apparently the most important of these has been children, as 48 percent
of the available national program funds have gone for children's programs. 122 In formulating its recommendations to CPB on program funding,
PBS relies on general factors such as audience appeal, inability to produce
the program locally, diversity of programming, stimulation of audience
123
interest in ptv, etc.
A new approach to national funding was effected on July 1, 1974. CPB
then committed part of its available national programming funds to the
stations under a new Station Program Cooperative plan. 124 To summarize
the complex new arrangement, the ptv stations decide, by vote, which
programs will be funded for the coming program year, 125 with voting power
being allocated roughly according to the size of each station's audience. 12 6
CPB will, however, provide programming funds on a matching basis only:
three dollars by CPB for each one dollar provided by the stations. 2 The
programming funds not committed by CPB to the Station Program Cooperative will be used to develop new programs chosen by CPB and to sup2
port the continuation of programs chosen by CPB.1 8
2. Operation of the Interconnection-By the end of 1973 over two
hundred ptv stations were part of the PBS system and thus linked to the
interconnection.1 29 If PBS decides to transmit a program, more than 200
stations will receive it and may choose to broadcast it. (Of course, anyone
may send a videotape to a ptv station in the hope that it will be broadcast
and anyone willing, or able, to make 200 copies of the tape may duplicate
the PBS distribution system by using the mails instead. However, even if
Id.
Statement of Henry Loomis, President, CPB, Hearings on S. 3825 Before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Commerce Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
56 (1974).
122 Testimony of Thomas B. Curtis, Chairman, CPB, 1973 Hearings,supra note 110,
at 27.
123 "Public Broadcasting Service," statement appended to testimony of Hartford
Gunn, President, PBS, 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 408-11.
124 N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1974, at 78, col. I.
125 N.Y. Times, March 15, 1974, at 67, col. 2.
126 Id.
127 Id. See also Accuracy in Media v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288, 292 n.14, which states
the matching formula to be four to five (station funds to material cooperative funds).
128 N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1974, at 78, col. 1.
129 Not all stations are electronically linked; those that are not are served by mail.
Testimony of Thomas B. Curtis, Chairman, CPB, 1973 Hearings, supra note 110,
120
121

at 70.
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one could do so, we can assume that the recipients would be less likely to
broadcast the program than they would a program selected and implicitly
endorsed by PBS.) Moreover, if PBS transmits a program during regularly
scheduled broadcast hours almost two-thirds of the interconnected ptv
stations will broadcast it directly as it is transmitted to them simply because
they do not have the equipment which would allow them to tape it while
simultaneously broadcasting another program. 1 0 Consequently, if they do
not broadcast the PBS transmission as it comes in they will never be able
to do so, at least unless PBS retransmits it. Any station which does not
broadcast the transmission must have something else immediately available
to substitute or it cannot broadcast at all. As CPB President Loomis said
of the many stations with insufficient equipment, "They are locked into the
fixed schedule network distribution ....
131
Not all programs are transmitted by PBS at a time when it would be
suitable to broadcast them directly. A smaller proportion are transmitted
"off-schedule" so that even the equipment-deficient station can tape them
132
and review them for possible later broadcast.
Given these facts, the PBS interconnection is of enormous importance in
the process of distributing ideas in the United States. How is it determined
who shall have access to this system? The answer depends essentially on
the source of funds used to produce a program. Programs funded by CPB
will presumably be transmitted by PBS. 133 Thus, although CPB effectively
makes the decision to transmit, PBS decides which programs not funded by
CPB (programs produced locally or with foundation or corporate support)
34
will be scheduled for distribution.1
A commitment by PBS to transmit a program, however, does not guarantee transmission in the exact form produced since prior to actual transmission, PBS reviews each program for compliance with certain PBS
programming standards. 135 These are contained in two policy statements
adopted by the PBS Board, a Statement on Program Standards 3 6 and a
Statement of Journalism Standards and Guidelines. 37 Both were promulgated in order to assure that programs transmitted will be "acceptable to a
substantial portion of the local stations.' 138 Each has procedural as well
as substantive provisions. According to the Statement on Program Standards
130Testimony of Henry Loomis, President, CPB, 1973 Hearings, supra note 110,
at 45.

Id.
"Public Broadcasting Service," addendum to testimony of Hartford N. Gunn,
Jr., President, PBS, 1973 Hearings,supra note 110, at 412-13.
133Id. at 407, 409-11.
134 Id. at 411-13. According to PBS:
Programs are generally chosen for PBS national distribution where they
are timely, provided [sic] balance to the interconnection schedule and
have a general audience appeal or appeal to a defined audience identified as a valuable target for national programming.
Id. at 412.
135Id. at 413.
131

132

136

Id. at 414-15.

137Id. at 415-16.
" 8 Id. at 414.
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PBS will transmit "in some fashion," any program to which it has previously made a commitment, unless the content is illegal, with illegality
apparently including violations of the fairness doctrine and other provisions
of the Communications Act of 1934.139 (PBS is further obligated to transmit
previously scheduled programs by the partnership agreement with CPB.
That obligation is also subject to PBS standards.) 140 PBS procedures in
furtherance of the fairness doctrine are noteworthy because of the special
burden they put on producers for ptv. Since these procedures require that
such producers themselves meet the requirements of the doctrine, if a producer does a program on one side of an issue he must also agree to do one
141
on the other side, if asked.
Even if obligated to transmit a program, PBS does not lose all control
over it because that obligation is satisfied by transmitting the program "off
schedule,"' 42 at times when stations are not likely to broadcast it directly
as it is transmitted to them but must instead tape it and broadcast later if
they so choose. 143 Under a related policy, PBS reserves the right to "de44
mand an alternative version of a program with difficult taste problems."'
Given the power to remove a program from the interconnection mainstream
and thereby deprive it of much of its audience, a "demand" from PBS to
a producer is not likely to go unheeded. Additional control is exercised by
PBS when it alerts the local station to the content problem prior to transmission 145 ("flags" the problem). This might cause a station to decide not
to broadcast it.
In determining whether to distribute a program off schedule, or have it
altered, or flag it, PBS refers to the substantive provision of its Statement
on Program Standards and its Statement of Journalism Standards and

139 Id. at 407, 415. As understood by PBS,

The Fairness Doctrine is designed to promote the presentation of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on issues of public importance.
It requires that, where a program concerns a controversial issue of public importance, the broadcaster has an affirmative obligation to present
responsible spokesmen with contrasting viewpoints. This obligation
does not require that each program broadcast must contain a balanced
presentation of the various viewpoints on a given issue, but that the
necessary balance must be struck over the entire range of a broadcaster's programming. The obligations imposed by the Fairness Doctrine, as is the case with the equal time obligations, may not be
delegated by the broadcaster.
id. at 416-17.
140 According to paragraph two of the Joint Resolution, supra note 109,
All non-CPB funded programs accepted under PBS Broadcast Journalism standards and normal PBS procedures will have access to the interconnection. In the event of disagreement between CPB and PBS over
whether a program should be scheduled for transmission the dispute is
resolved by a joint CPB-PBS committee set up under the partnership
agreement.
141 Addendum to 1973 Hearings,supra note 132, at 417.
142

143
144
145

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

407.
413.
407.
413-14.
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Guidelines.146 The latter statement requires that ptv journalism be "fair,
balanced and objective and that it afford access to views both inside and
outside the existing consensus."'1 47 More specifically, it abjures ptv reporters
to avoid affecting the events they are covering, prohibits staging of events,
requires editing faithful to the tone of the original material, asks that clear
distinctions be drawn between news and commentary, and requires that the
prejudice of criminal trials by publicity be avoided. 148 The Statement on
Program Standards, insofar as it addresses itself to the substance of material
not illegal, goes primarily to questions of taste. 149 Under this statement,
PBS seeks to protect local audiences from ptv programming distasteful to
them, but does not expect the "most timid" local station to be able to
impose its standards on the entire system. 150 Exercise of PBS control over
the interconnection has reportedly resulted in some troublesome decisions. 151 Among these was the deletion of a segment of the ptv-produced
Great American Dream Machine in which the FBI was accused of using
agents provacateurs in its policing of radical groups. 15 2 The material was
deleted by PBS prior to transmission to the ptv stations' 53 who then had no
choice but to broadcast the cut version of the program or not broadcast it
at all. PBS justified the deletion as concern for legal problems which might
arise if it were broadcast.5 4 Nonetheless, the segment was broadcast a few
days later as a part of a program called Behind the Lines which dealt with
problems in journalism and this program was transmitted in its entirety by
155
PBS to its member stations.
Other programming alleged to have been edited at PBS' instance prior
to broadcast included parts of the Nader Report critical of tv cereal advertising and gasoline commercials. 156 PBS objections to material in a
Woody Allen skit scheduled to be broadcast led to its cancellation as
well. 157 Steambath, a play by Bruce Jay Friedman produced for ptv by
KCET in Los Angeles, was not nationally distributed by PBS reportedly
because some scenes included semi-nudity and blasphemy. 158 National
distribution was also refused to a BBC damatization of Nana by Emil Zola,
which was reportedly considered too sexually explicit by PBS. 159 These

at 414-16.
415.
415-16.
149 The addendum to 1973 Hearings states: "The Statement requires [sic] that
producers adhere strictly to the requirements of the Communications Act and the
Fairness Doctrine." Id. at 415.
146 Id.

147 Id. at
148id. at

150 Id. at 413-14.

The incidents described herein are based on reports in the public press.
F. POWLEDGE, supra note 15, at 39-43.
153 Id. at 41. The deletion followed an attempt to negotiate changes satisfactory
to PBS and the producer. Id.
154Id. at 39-41.
155 Id. at 41-42.
156 THE FOURTH NETWORK, supra note 21, at 34.
157 F. POWLEDGE, supra note 15, at 44-46.
158 N.Y. Times, March 2, 1974, at 63, col. 3.
159 N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1973, at 86, col. 1.
151

152
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reports have resulted in "self-censorship" on the part of people producing
programs for ptv. 160°
B. The Misuse of Federal Power Over PTV
The power over communications enjoyed by the CPB and PBS officials
can be abused simply by its exercise, no matter how benevolent the ends.
Closely tied to government in numerous ways' 61 and dependent on government for funds, 162 these officials are so hard to separate from government
that their power to determine which voices shall be heard and which shall
not raise serious questions. Although this alone is cause for concern, a more
disturbing problem is the exercise of that power in response to perceived
wishes of federal government officials. The public record indicates that
such abuse is present and that it flows primarily from dependence on federal
63
funds. This problem has been openly acknowledged by CPB officials.
1. The Origins of the Power-The special ties between CPB and government have already been described. 6 4 Before turning to the indications that
those ties have opened it to government influence we should describe the
relationship of PBS to the federal government.
Unlike CPB, PBS management is not chosen by government' 65 and its
funds are indirectly provided by government. 166 Nonetheless, the potential
for influence, either directly from the government or indirectly through CPB,
appears to be significant. By way of background we should reiterate that
PBS was created to serve the important public purposes of the Act in which
Congress recognized that "one or more systems of interconnection" ought
be established as part of the congressional plan to aid public broadcasting. 167 PBS was created by CPB to fulfill that end. 168 In recognition of the
importance of the interconnection to the statutory plan, Congress not only
funds PBS but also authorizes the common carriers which transmit the
interconnection signals to provide this service at reduced rates. 169 This
recognition is likewise reflected in the PBS corporate charter. 7 0
160 F. POWLEDGE, supra note 15, at 15 (quoting James Day, head of National
Educational Television, a major ptv producer).
161 See text accompanying notes 67-77 supra.
162 See text accompanying notes 94-95 supra.
163 See note 241 infra. Arguing for long term public broadcasting funding, CPB
President Henry Loomis said:
Since the appropriation process is a matter of judgment, public broadcasting remains vulnerable to undue pressures from the executive and
legislative branches of government and from all types of interest groups.
Statement of Henry Loomis, President of CPB, Hearings on S. 3825 Belore the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Commerce Comm., 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 57 (1974).
164 See text accompanying notes 67-77 supra.
165 PBS' directors are chosen by its members, i.e., the ptv licensees. See note 114
supra.
166 See note 115 supra and note 171 infra.
16747 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(B) (1970).
168 See 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 221.

169 47 U.S.C. § 396(h) (1970).
170 Certificate and Articles of PBS § 8 (1969).
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PBS has historically been financed by grants from CPB171 and since
172
roughly 90 percent of CPB's budget is derived from the United States
it is apparent that PBS is in large part publicly funded as well. That the
funds are not provided directly by the United States is not significant because the money granted to PBS by CPB is not a matter of discretion with
the CPB. CPB serves as a mere conduit for money appropriated by Con73
gress with the intent that it be used by PBS for the interconnection.
During the appropriation process PBS relates to Congress as it would if it
received direct appropriations: its officials testify at the relevant committee
hearings as to budgetary and policy matters. 74 In fact in its 1973 hearings
on public television appropriations, some members of the Senate Subcommittee on Communication expressed a desire 75 that federal funds, including those granted to PBS, be controlled by CPB and thus ultimately by
17 6
Congress.
Consistently with its representations to Congress, CPB has publicly
claimed the power to dictate the allocation of authority between it and
PBS, though PBS has not endorsed the CPB view. The CPB Board adopted
a resolution on January 10, 1973, whereby, pursuant to creating a "new
relationship" with PBS, it withdrew from PBS the power to share with CPB
the authority for decisions relating to program funding and program trans-

171 E.g., in each of fiscal years 1971 and 1972, the grants amounted to almost $9
million. See financial statements included in 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 400
n.1, 402 n.l. Since PBS now collects dues from member stations the amount it receives from CPB will be less, but will nonetheless remain substantial. 1973 CPB
ANN. REP., supra note 118, at 19.
172 1973 CPB ANN. REP., supra note 118, at 22.
'73 See CPB budget summaries for years 1971-1975 provided to Congress by
CPB at the 1973 appropriation hearings. Each annual budget whether actual or
future estimate includes a substantial sum labeled "Distribution (PBS)." 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 68, Table 2.
174 See, e.g., 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 145. See also testimony of Hartford N. Gunn, Jr., President, PBS, id. at 106-39.
175 Senator Baker put it this way in his opening statement:
While I believe there must be meaningful consultation with the local
stations on program development, the Corporation [for Public Broadcasting] is responsible under the law for the interconnection system,
how it is used, what it is used for, and who uses it.
The ultimate responsibility cannot be delegated or shared.
The Corporation must remain fully accountable to the Congress,
not only for its use of federally appropriated funds, but also for the
stewardship of the publicly subsidized and federally funded interconnection system.
1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 7.
176 Senator Baker was assured by Thomas B. Curtis, then President of CPB, that
such control over PBS was indeed maintained.
Senator Baker: All you have to do to put my mind at rest is to say
one thing, and that is that you recognize and you understand your
statutory responsibility as the agency for the handling of Federal funds,
and that you are going to do that to the best of your ability.
Mr. Curtis: The buck stops here. You are darn right it does. And we
will not avoid it.
Id. at 34.
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mission. 17 7 The formulation was unacceptable to PBS and its member
licensees. 178 A period of negotiation between the two corporations followed
which, on May 31, 1973, led to the announcement of the partnership agreement under which they agreed to share authority over the interconnection. 7 9 Under the terms of the agreement CPB and PBS are committed to
joint decision making in the crucial areas of program funding, distribution,
and scheduling. 80
If the ability of PBS to negotiate a share of power from CPB appears to
indicate that PBS is not subject to total control by the former, the agreement arrived at by them evidences the continuing power of CPB to at least
influence PBS management of the interconnection, a task which is of
course PBS' "primary function."' 8' Thus government influence over PBS
might make itself felt directly as a result of the appropriation process or,
indirectly, through CPB and the partnership agreement.
2. The Exercise of Power-Officials of the Nixon administration openly
attempted to influence the development of ptv on two levels: they sought
to modify the structure of the system and to affect the kinds of programs
the structure produced. As to the former the basic thrust of administration
spokesmen was that the system had become too centralized under the too
vigorous leadership of CPB, thus frustrating the statutory goal of
localism.' 8 2 This was the theme of a major speech to the National Association of Educational Broadcasters by Clay T. Whitehead, then Director of
the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP). Mr. Whitehead specifically
accused CPB of establishing a fourth network in contravention of the
Act. 8 3 His criticisms were coupled with an implied threat to oppose fund177 According to a CPB press release which described the resolution, it contained

a restatement of some of the language of the law establishing the Corporation, which holds the CPB Board solely responsible for the
federal money in public broadcasting. The Board resolution further
states that all of the authorities and all of the responsibilities vested in
the Corporation pursuant to the Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 are
those of the CPB Board. While, in appropriate circumstances, the
Board may delegate its authority or arrange to exercise its authority
by contractual or other arrangements, it may not and should not delegate its responsibilities under the Act ....

The Board also received-

and fully concurred in-advice from counsel that the 1967 Act gives
CPB the ultimate responsibility, and accountability to Congress, for
the proper use of the interconnection facilities funded by CPB.
CPB Board Revises Relationship With PBS, CPB Press Release (Jan. 11, 1973).
178 Statement of William Harley, Chairman, National Association of Educational
Broadcasters, 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 108. The NAEB was then in the
process of merger with PBS. Id. at 120. The conflict between PBS and CPB which
relates to the questions of authority and which took place in the spring of 1973 is
described in A Hot Campaign to Interest Public in Public TV, BROADCASTING, Jan.
28, 1974, at 36-37.
See discussion at 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 121-31.
180 Joint Resolution, supra note 109.
181 Statement of PBS President Gunn, Hearings on H.R. 16338 and H.R. 16580
Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power, Comm. on Interstate & For170

eign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 91-153, 84 (1970).
182 See text accompanying notes 183-93 infra.

183 Remarks of Clay T. Whitehead, Director, OTP, Executive Office of the
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ing efforts if no change in policy was forthcoming.18 4 This speech was
viewed by public broadcasting as an "intensely political" effort to "shake
the uneasy public broadcasting structure."' 1 5 The culmination of this
campaign, according to then CPB President John Macy was the 1972
presidential veto of the CPB funding bill.186
Administration support for ptv funding was again linked to structural
change by Mr. Whitehead in the 1973 hearings before the Senate Communications Subcommittee 8 7 when he opposed a bill containing a two year appropriation on the ground that annual review of the system's "progress"'' 88
with regard to achieving a more localized structure was necessary. 8 9 When
CPB subsequently announced the formation of the Station Program Cooperative' 9" with its localization of control over some ptv programming
funds, it was speculated that this change in structure was an attempt to
satisfy administration critics and it was predicted that executive support of
long range funding would follow.' 9' In fact, a five year funding bill was
produced by Mr. Whitehead's office and forwarded to Congress in July,
1974, some months after the Station Program Cooperative was announced. 192 This was seen by some as a reflection of administration approval
193
of CPB's new directions.
Administration attempts to affect the organization of the ptv system
through the legislative process should be viewed as properly within the
scope of review of any federal program. No social program has a legal
claim to funding in perpetuity, but on the basis of the public record it is
arguable that Mr. Whitehead's objections to the structure of the system
incorporated an objection to the program content produced by the structure. This raises problems of a very different sort. In his 1971 speech before
the National Association of Educational Broadcasters, for example, Mr.
Whitehead tied his structural and programming criticisms closely to-

President, at the 47th Annual Convention, National Association of Educational
Broadcasters, Oct. 20, 1971, reproduced in BARRET, THE POLITICS OF BROADCASTING 219, 221 (1973).
184 Id. at 224.
185 John Macy, President, CPB, quoted in H. ASHMORE, supra note 101, at 95.
186 Id.
187 Testimony of Clay T. Whitehead, 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 85-93.
188Id. at 90.
189 Id. at 87-90.
190 See text accompanying notes 24-28 supra.
191 N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1974, at 78, col. 1.
192 N.Y. Times, July 21, 1974, at 2E, col. 2.
193 The New York Times reported that,
[p]ractically everyone in public broadcasting had understood that Mr.
Whitehead was proposing a deal: That if the industry decentralized
and balanced its political spectrum, the White House would recommend
legislation for the kind of funding that would enable the noncommercial television industry to plan beyond a year at a time. . ..
Mr. Whitehead's office began working on the bill to fulfill its ends of
the bargain, after the public broadcasting industry demonstrated its
compliance with the wishes of the White House.
N.Y. Times, June 10, 1974, at 63, col. 3.
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gether. 94 One theme of the speech was that centralization was not only
an evil in itself but that the programs reflected the views of the CPB superstructure which, he thought, was both too weighted in favor of public affairs
and too East Coast oriented. 195 In a subsequent radio interview, Mr. Whitehead questioned whether public affairs programs and news commentary
could properly be produced with federal funds provided by the Act. 196
A more direct attack on CPB funded programming was also made by
Patrick Buchanan, an aide to President Nixon. 197 CPB reportedly decided
Remarks of Clay T. Whitehead, supra note 183. Mr. Whitehead said, e.g.,
CPB seems to have decided to make permanent financing the principal
goal and to aim for programming with a national impact on the public
and the Congress to achieve it. But look at the box that puts you in.
The local station is asked-and sometimes willingly accedes-to sacrifice its autonomy to facilitate funding for the national system. When
this happens, it also jeopardizes your ability to serve the educational
and instructional needs of your communities. All the glamor is packed
into your nighttime schedules and the tendency is to get more public
attention by focusing on the news, public affairs and cultural programs
that are aimed for the general audience. But there must be more
balance in your service to your communities. In quantitative terms,
your schedules are already split equally between instructional and general programming. But in qualitative terms, are you devoting enough
of your resources to the learning needs of your in-school and in-home
audiences?
Id. at 223-24.
194

195 Mr. Whitehead also stated that,
[o]n a national basis, PBS says that some 40 percent of its programming is devoted to public affairs. You're centralizing your public affairs
programs in the National Public Affairs Center in Washington, because someone thinks autonomy in regional centers leads to wasteful
overlap and duplication. Instead of aiming for "overprogramming" so
local stations can select among the programs produced and presented
in an atmosphere of diversity, the system chooses central control for
,efficient' long-range planning and so-called 'coordination' of news and
public affairs--coordinated by people with essentially similar outlooks.
How different will be your networked news programs from the programs that Fred Friendly and Sander Vanocur wanted to do at CBS
and NBC?
Id. at 220.
196 As quoted by John Macy (then CPB President) in H. ASHMORE, supra note
101, at 95.
19T Mr. Buchanan said:
Now, when that came down to the White House, we took a look at
[the proposed funding] and we also looked at the situation over there,
I did personally. I had a hand in drafting the veto message. And if you
look at the public television, you will find you've got Sander Vanocur
and Robert MacNeil, the first of whom, Sander Vanocur, is a notorious
Kennedy sycophant, in my judgment, and Robert MacNeil, who is antiadministration. You have the Elizabeth Drew show on, which is, she
personally is definitely not pro-administration. I would say antiadministration. Washington Week Review is unbalanced against us,
you have Black Journal, which is unbalanced against us . . . you have
Bill Moyer's, which is unbalanced against the [Administration]. ...
And then for a fig leaf they throw in William F. Buckley's program.
So they sent down there a $165 million package, voted 82 to 1 out of
the Senate, thinking that Richard Nixon would therefore-he would
have to sign it, he couldn't possibly have the courage to veto some-
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not to provide funds for the programs criticized by Mr. Buchanan except
for Black Journal.198 Nongovernment funds were later found for the
threatened programs. 199
Congress' influence on the ptv system, like that of the Executive, is
present whether or not it is exercised directly. Its power over ptv funds
means that ptv officials are influenced by their perception of congressional
desires, even if Congress expresses no desires. 20 0 On the whole Congress
has been more gentle in its efforts to influence the program content than has
the Executive, and a substantial part of congressional concern with program
content has come only in response to the executive attack already described.
The Senate Commerce Committee in 1973 asserted that public affairs
201
broadcasting was an appropriate part of the federally funded system.
Regardless of the committee's motivation however, this assertion demonstrates that Congress also will involve itself in programming decisions when
members are moved to do SO. 20 2 However, individual members of Congress
have not restricted themselves to a concern for programs attacked by the
Executive.2 0 3 During the 1973 authorization hearings Senator Pastore
thing like that ....

And all this Administration has ever asked for on

that, or on any network television, frankly, is a fair shake.
Quoted by Senator Pastore at 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 8.
198 Id. See also CPB Board Approves $2.3 million in TV Programs, CPB Press
Release (March 7, 1973). Since the press release is dated prior to Mr. Buchanan's
statement, it is impossible for the funding decisions to have been made in response
to it. However, the statement was apparently a summation of the administration's
views on public affairs programming and may have been communicated privately at
an earlier date. Thomas Curtis, CPB Chairman at the time the programs were reviewed, commented that "[C]ertain people in the Nixon Administration, have
clearly expressed [dissatisfaction] and . . . put pressure on ....
" The Campaign to
Politicize Broadcasting,COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., March/April, 1973, at 14.
According to the New York Times the programs were deleted because some CPB
board members believed federal funds should not be used for the production of "con-

troversial" programs. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1973, at 63, col. 2.
199 N.Y. Times, June 23, 1973, at 63, col. 2.
203 As John Macy, a former CPB President, put it, "[w]e had anticipated trouble
with Congress, but objections from Capitol Hill were reasonable and infrequent
until the Executive Branch began to orchestrate the attack. H. ASHMORE, supra note
101, at 95. See also statements collected at F. POWLEDGE, THE ENGINEERING OF
RESTRAINT (A REPORT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION) 36-38 (1971).

In Accuracy in Media v. FCC, 521 F.2d 288. 294 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court stated:
"Congress reserved for itself the oversight responsibility for CPB." At note 31 the
court quotes some Congressmen who expressed a willingness to use the appropriation
process to control program content.
201 S. REP. No. 123, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
202 See 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 8-9. Later in the course of these hearings the following related discussion took place:
Sen. Hollings: I most respectfully demur from that idea that you
don't know how you cut off known popular programs, such as the
Buckley program, and in their place put others that are completely
unknown, popular or otherwise. I mean what kind of policy is that....
Mr. Curtis: Well, we didn't. I don't think you would say "Sesame
Street" is unpopular, or "Zoom," or these children programs.
Sen. Pastore: If you cut that out you are going to lose me.
Id. at 27.
203 Note Senator Pastore's expression of support for children's programs. Id. In
this he has been joined by Senator Cook. Id. at 91.
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introduced a letter from Senator Williams urging more programming for
handicapped viewers. 20 4 In a subsequent responsive letter CPB assured the
subcommittee that it "is committed as a matter of policy to providing
programs for special audiences such as the handicapped. ' 20 5
Program content considerations also underlay an amendment to the
Act 20 6 adopted by Congress in 1973 which requires ptv licensees to retain
audio tapes of programs in which "any issue of public importance is discussed. '20 7 The tapes (to be retained for sixty days) must be made
available, upon demand, to the FCC or to any person tendering payment
of the cost of a copy. 208 This amendment was proposed by Senator Griffin
who argued that the requirement was necessary in order to assure the public that the objectivity and balance 20 9 provisions of the Act were being
met. 210 The Senator's concern was sparked when PBS refused to make
available to him a transcript of a ptv program about the ABM, which, he
had heard, was "biased and unbalanced. '211 Although Senator Griffin
stated that the availability of such tapes would avoid government censorship,2 12 it would seem rather that the maintenance of tapes could lead to
censorship by facilitating an intensive post-broadcast scrutiny of programming. More important, perhaps, is the lesson learned by PBS: even
a single "controversial" program may so pique a given legislator that it
alone could result in additional restrictions in the ptv system. This is
likely to have an effect on the kinds of programming funded and distributed on the interconnection.
To read the foregoing publicly reported events as an isolated political
attack by one administration or given legislators would be to miss the
deeper point. Politicians will act on their interests as they see them. Their
control over ptv funds gives them a lever which some will find too tempting
not to use and when so used, it both strains credulity and denies history
to believe that the administrators of public broadcasting will not be
213
responsive.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 60.
206 47 U.S.C. § 399(b) (Supp. 1973).
207 47 U.S.C. § 399(b) (1970). No such requirement applies to commercial breadcasters. Cf. 47 C.F.R. § 73.669, mandating program logs.
208 47 U.S.C. § 399(b) (Supp. 1973).
209 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970). See text accompanying note 80 supra.
210 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 114-16.
211 Id. at 114.
212 Id.
213 Responsiveness to the political will has been alleged most often with regard
to funding decisions. See notes 196-200 and accompanying text supra. See also
Canby, The First Amnendnent and the State as Editor: Implications for Public
Broadcasting, 52 TEXAS L. REV. 1123 (1974). There are some indications, however,
which would support the logical surmise that the administration of the interconnection has been likewise influenced. In a public discussion of the decision to delete
the FBI segment from The Great American Dream Machine (see text accompanying notes 152-55 supra) Hartford N. Gunn, Jr., President of PBS at the time, hinted
at the problem raised for him by public funding:
It seems to me the crucial question is whether our confidence-or,
204
205
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IV.

THE

PTV

SYSTEM IN RELATION TO FIRST

AMENDMENT VALUES

A. The Interests at Stake
Three different classes of persons have free speech interests relevant to
the public broadcasting system: 2 14 the program producer, whose interest is
in creating and distributing his product free from government control; the
broadcaster, whose interest is in exercising his own editorial judgment
when deciding what to broadcast; and the viewer, whose interest is in
receiving the programming free of government influence. The interests of
all of these are not only in freedom from negative restrictions, that is, censorship, but also in freedom from government efforts to appropriate the ptv
system for the promotion of its own views. The latter concern might be
seen in terms of party politics since neither major party wants the other to
be able to use ptv as a reelection aid. It could be viewed in more fundarather, whether the public's confidence in us would be jeopardized;
and we try to look at programming and the problems that programs
present in terms of maintaining credibility with the public. If we loseif we were ever to lose that credibility, then all of what we are trying
to accomplish in Public Broadcasting goes down the drain.
THE FOURTH NETWORK, supra note 21, at 39. It has been suggested that PBS' assumption of control over content of interconnected programming was intended to
assure Congress that public broadcasting could keep its own house in order. F.
POWLEDGE, supra note 15, at 16. Cf. statement of James Day, head of National
Educational Television, to the effect that the caution of the local stations rather
than the federal government is the cause of "blandness" in ptv. Id. at 15. See also
Canby, supra note 213.
214 Of course, the first amendment is irrelevant unless governmental action is
present but no court has yet decided whether CPB, PBS, or any ptv station is
vested with state action. In dictum, Justice Douglas stated that first amendment
considerations would be relevant to ptv activities generally as opposed to private
broadcast licensees.
Public broadcasting, of course, raises quite different problems from
those tendered by the TV outlets involved in this litigation. . . . Congress has authorized the creation of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, whose Board of Directors is appointed by the President by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate. 47 U.S.C. § 396 ....
It is
a nonprofit organization and by the terms of § 396(b) is said not to be
"an agency or establishment of the United States Government." Yet,
since it is a creature of Congress whose management is in the hands
of a Board named by the President and approved by the Senate, it is
difficult to see why it is not a federal agency engaged in operating a
"press" as that word is used in the First Amendment.
CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 149 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
Professor Canby has also concluded that state action was present as to CPB, PBS,
and the ptv stations. Canby, supra note 213, at 1151-53, 1159. Both CPB and PBS
have argued, however, that they are not state action entities. See briefs filed in support of motion to dismiss in Network Project v. CPB, 398 F. Supp. 1332 (D.D.C.
1975). Brief of CPB at 35; Brief of PBS at 44. See also Jennes, Memorandum of Law:
Various Legal Aspects of the Corporation for Public Television, REPORT, supra
note 2, at 131. For the purposes of this article, whether it is conclusive as a matter of
of law that state action is present is not of importance inasmuch as we are here
concerned with legislative, not judicial, review of ptv. The importance of federal
funds to the system and the apparent attempts by federal officials to use those
funds as a means of influence should concern Congress whether or not it concerns
the courts.

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 9:62

mental terms: government might expect ptv to promote support for the
established American society or at least to keep its programming free of
subversive (in the broad sense) activities.
Presentation of government-endorsed opinions or information is neither
illegal nor undesirable. Government has a duty to inform the people about
its policies and the reasons for choosing them. Even the mobilization of
public opinion behind official programs is, within limits, not inappropriate.
It is nonetheless doubtful whether a national tv network operated by the
government could find constitutional support in these considerations because the large scale of the system would involve risks of manipulation far
outweighing any foreseeable justification. 215 (Such constitutional limits are
only indirectly relevant here, though, because the ptv system is by statute
prohibited from directly serving as a government network.) 216 Neither party
has so far been able to use ptv as a political vehicle, and it is not likely to
217
happen as the Act is well designed to prevent at least that.
Efforts to promote "the system" are difficult to isolate or even define. It
has been alleged that the educational component of ptv programming is
used to promote governmentally approved values which may or may not
be universally shared. 218 This may be an unavoidable concomitant of any
educational effort, but acceptance of this fact should not end the inquiry.
Education via ptv has about it attributes not present in the normal public
school system. It is national rather than local, thus expanding the power
of those who design the curriculum, and it involves greater passivity on the
part of the pupil. A three year old viewing Sesame Street watches, listens,
2 19
learns, and enjoys, but does not participate and cannot object or criticize.
Still, the most obvious problems that have been raised by ptv thus far have
not involved efforts to promote, but rather efforts to censor motivated
220
political concerns.
All of those with first amendment interests related to ptv are threatened
by its current structure because of the control PBS and CPB exercise over

215 This fear was expressed in the comments of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, In re Jurisdiction of the Commission with Respect to Section 396 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended (April 15, 1973) at 14:
Historically, the American system of mass communications has been
one of free enterprise, free competition and private ownership. There
has been a traditional and compelling reluctance to embark on any
program of Government-operated radio or television, which would
have clear Orwellian connotations.
See also 2 Z. CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 762-63 (1947).
In Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969), the Court said that
a discussion of ". . . the official government view dominating public broadcasting
• . . would raise more serious First Amendment issues."
210
See text accompanying notes 64-66, 68-71, 86 supra.
217 See text accompanying notes 68-71 supra. See also Canby, supra note 213,
at 2 1152-53.
1
8 THE NETWORK PROJECT,

DOWN SESAME STREET (1973).

219These problems are examined in detail at id. Viewing some educational
programs is by no means wholly voluntary, as many school systems have incorporated
them into the required curriculum. Id. at 31.
220 See text accompanying notes 183-202 supra.
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the interconnection, 221 and because of CPB's power to choose which programs to fund. 222 The interests of producers and audience can likewise be
threatened by broadcaster decisions. 22 Two different first amendment doctrines are applicable to the protection of these interests.
Under one approach government influence is minimized by authorizing
persons with ongoing editorial responsibility to exercise it according to
their own personal preferences and relying upon the courts to protect them
from interference by other officials.2 24 A different tack is to bar all the
managers of the resource in question from exercising control over content. 225 It is our contention that each of these approaches may be relevant
to ptv but that application of the latter to CPB and PBS would more effectively reduce government influence.

B. Comparative Suitability for PTV of
Available First Amendment Approaches
1. Cases Permitting Content Control by Government Sponsored Communications Facilities-A number of cases have recognized the right of
government-supported facilities to exercise editorial powers not unlike those
226
In Avins v. Rutgers227
held by managers of privately owned periodicals.
the court rejected an author's attempt to obtain a judicial reversal of the
Rutgers Law Review's refusal to publish his manuscript. The plaintiff had
argued that the Review had discriminated against him because of his conservative approach to school segregation law. The discrimination was illegal, he urged, because the Review operated with state funds. The district
court, and the court of appeals in affirmance, held that the undeniable
presence of state action did not deprive the editors of the discretion they
needed to produce a quality journal. 228 This decision was dictated by the
reality that no state university could publish a law review or any other
serious journal without the power to edit. Given the importance of state
See text accompanying notes 129-55 supra.
See text accompanying notes 117-28 supra.
223 Most ptv stations receive substantial amounts of state and local funds. 1974
Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 51-52. Those local governments too can be a
source of improper influence. See text accompanying note 1 supra. See also BARRET,
supra note 183, at 74, in which the following statement is attributed to the "Mississippi educational tv network" [sic]:
The Board of Directors for the Mississippi Authority for Educational
Television has squelched most attempts at public affairs programming.
We are a state-owned agency and the board feels we should stay away
from controversy as much as possible.
224 See text accompanying notes 226-34 infra.
225 This is usually referred to as the "public forum doctrine." See text accompanying notes 236-40 infra.
226 A thorough and insightful discussion of these cases is found at Canby, supra
note 213, at 1131-43.
227 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). Rutgers is a
state-supported university.
228 Id. at 153-54.
221

222
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support to American education, the Third Circuit could hardly have gone
229
the other way.
The true independence of the editors of government-supported media is
not easily won. We have observed that state support can lead to state influence or attempts at influence. In the context of a journal published with
state funds the intrusion usually comes at the hands of a university official
who seeks to censor editorial content believed unwise, inappropriate, or in
conflict with general university goals. 230 Although the prior commitment of
editorial power is often disregarded in favor of either prior restraint or
punishment of an offending student, in general, the courts have been ready
to enjoin direct official interference with editorial control previously reposed elsewhere. This is justifiable in part by reference to the first amendment rights of the journal editors and it also finds support in the rights of
the readers. They have an interest that communications purportedly free
of government control be actually so, since otherwise they will be subjected
to hidden manipulation by the holders of power. For this reason Professor
Emerson, who indorses a limited power of government to speak to the public via the media, conditions his endorsement on disclosure of the govern2 -31
ment presence.
In insisting on an absence of censorship of state-supported media, the
courts have permitted the states to establish a medium enjoying the same
editorial discretion as the private media, but have not permitted them to
use their official ties to the medium in a manner inconsistent with its supposed privateness.
The same approach could be used as a model for the ptv system. Under
a similar fiction the ptv stations, CPB, PBS, and ptv producers could all be
regarded as private media each entitled to exercise editorial control over its
own communication facility. CPB, for example, would be free to fund
programs on the present basis (which takes content into account), yet
should any federal official attempt to control or influence a programming
decision, an injunction against him would lie to preserve the independence
of the ultimate decisions.
A variant of this model was suggested for ptv by Professor Canby. His
construct is more complex in that it also takes into account the need to
protect each ptv entity from the others, for example, the producers from
CPB, PBS, and the stations. 232 Professor Canby sees the ptv system as an
editorial chain comprised of the funding authority, the program producer,
and the ptv station manager. In his model system the funding authority is
initially vested with the editorial function, but when the authority delegates
that function to the program producer, the producer's judgment ought not
be subject to interference by anyone else in the chain. When CPB is not in
Canby, supra note 213, at 1132-34.
See, e.g., Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Mass. 1970); Dickey v.
State Board of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 613 (M.D. Ala. 1967), vacated on other grounds
sub nom. Troy State Univ. v. Dickey, 402 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1968). These cases
and others are discussed in Canby, supra note 213, at- 1138-49.
231 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 697 (1970).
232 Canby, supra note 213, at 1158-60.
229Accord,
230
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the chain at all (in the case of non-CPB-funded programs), CPB is never
vested with the editorial function and should be precluded from interfering
with content selection. Likewise, when PBS has not been in on the initial
decision-making, it is not in the chain and it ought not play a role in content
selection at any subsequent point. The ptv station manager, Canby argues,
is vested with his own editorial function which allows him to select from
among programs offered on the interconnection, although he is probably
constitutionally proscribed from editing them or running only part of a
series since this is an editorial function already committed. 233 In Professor
Canby's view, the courts should be available to prevent improper attempts
234
by an entity to control content.
Particularly troublesome about Professor Canby's approach is his willingness to allow PBS and CPB to continue to control ptv content on even
a limited basis. He does not sufficiently take into account the fact that CPB
and PBS enjoy power over a national system of communications and that
their power is magnified by the technological weaknesses within the ptv
system of the broadcasting stations. As noted previously, most of the broadcasters are locked into programming choices made centrally.2 35 To analogize CPB or PBS to a university journal is inadequate because of the
enormous difference in the power they exercise. This greater power is not
only important in itself but it also magnifies the likelihood that government
will seek to appropriate the power to its own use. This brings us to a second
reason for questioning Professor Canby's approach. He does not recognize
the difficulty-not to say impossibility-of insulating CPB, PBS, or any
other centralized facility from direct or indirect efforts to influence them.
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Canby's analogy fails because the
argument that a journal must have editorial powers if it is to enjoy a meaningful existence does not apply to CPB and PBS. Editorial supervision over
ptv programming can be vested with the ptv stations alone. So long as the
stations can choose the programs to be funded and edit completed programs
prior to broadcast it can not be argued that the CPB-PBS editorial judgment
is necessary (in the A vins sense) to protect the public interest in quality programming. These considerations dictate a structural reorganization of the
ptv system modeled on the public forum concept of government-supported
communications media.
2. The Public Forum Doctrine-Under the public forum doctrine, government facilities suitable for the communication of ideas must be allocated
in a procedurally fair manner and without regard to the content of the
views sought to be expressed. 236 One court nicely summed up the theoretical basis for the public forum doctrine:
233 Id. Professor Canby would apparently endorse
PBS editing of non-CPB
funded
programs.
Id.
at
1159.
2
34.d. at 1165.
235 See text accompanying notes 129-31 supra.
236 CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 193-96 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 298
et seq. (1970); Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public Fortum, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 931. See also note 240 infra.
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An official who can grant or deny the right to speak according to
is undistinguishable
what he deems to be in the 'public interest'
237
in all relevant respects from a censor.
Congress has imposed public forum status on several important commu23 8
and telephone service. 239
nications media, among them the postal service
Additionally, the courts have held the doctrine to be a constitutional
requirement in a number of different contexts. 240 Because the merits of the
doctrine have been more searchingly and recently examined by the
judiciary, we will use the rationale of three leading cases as the basis of
discussion. The Supreme Court recently narrowed the public forum doctrine
in Lehman v. Shaker Heights.241 The plaintiff was a candidate for state
office who had been denied advertising space on vehicles of the city transit
system due to a municipal policy which did not permit political advertising
in the city's buses, although allowing other types of advertising. Urging
that the bus posters constituted a public forum protected by the first amendment, petitioner argued that "there is a guarantee of nondiscriminatory
access to such publicly owned and controlled areas of communication 're-

237 Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
238 Postal Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1970). See esp. 39 U.S.C.

§§ 101(a), 403(a), (c), 3683 (1970). Cf. 39 U.S.C. § 30061 (1970), prohibiting use of
the mails for certain purposes, including lotteries, fraud, obscenity, information regarding abortion, incitement of crimes and foreign divorce information. The prohibition against abortion information was declared unconstitutional in Atlanta Co-op
News Project v. United States Postal Service, 350 F. Supp. 234 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (three
judge court), because it involved a prior restraint on speech. See also Lamont v.
Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), holding unconstitutional 39 U.S.C.
§ 4008(a) (1970) which prohibited the delivery through the mails of foreign Communist political propaganda in the absence of a request by the addressee that it be
delivered to him. The Court held the requirement to be an abridgement of the
recipient's first amendment rights.
239 Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1970); cf. 47 U.S.C. § 223
(1970) (prohibiting obscene, annoying, and threatening phone calls). See also Communications Satellite Act of 1962, 47 U.S.C. § 701(c) (1970).
240 The public forum doctrine has been applied when physical facilities such as
a park or auditorium are involved. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (illegal to discriminate against Jehovah's Witnesses seeking to hold a meeting in a
public park); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d 1273 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(unconstitutional to bar peace display from the Washington Monument area); Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 885 (1946) (illegal
to deny use of school auditorium to "subversive elements"). Public transit authorities have also been barred from denying use of their advertising facilities on a content basis. Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1968) (public
thoroughfares in bus terminal may not be closed to political leafleters and pickets
when they are open to glee clubs and the like); Kissinger v. New York City Transit
Authority, 274 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (barred a refusal to sell advertising
to peace groups). But see Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) and text
accompanying notes 241-49 infra. Use of the streets for free expression purposes is
subject to the same rule. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (improper to
prohibit diverse kinds of picketing near public schools so long as labor picketing was
allowed in the same area). See generally T. EMERSON, supra note 231, at 298-328,
359-64, 645-53; Gorlick, Right to a Forum, 71 DICK. L. REV. 273 (1966); Horning,
supra note 236.
241418 U.S. 298 (1974).
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gardless of the primary purpose to which the area is dedicated.'
Court disagreed:

",242

The

Although American constitutional jurisprudence, in the light of
the First Amendment, has been jealous to preserve access to public places for purposes of free speech, the nature of the forum
and the conflicting interests involved have remained important in
determining the degree 2of
protection afford by the Amendment to
43
the speech in question.

The Court noted that the case did not involve a meeting place or other
facility which had communication as its primary purpose. Rather, the city
was engaged in the business of public transportion and the advertising space
was incidental to the provision of public transportation as part of a commercial venture. In these circumstances the Court was willing to respect the
"business" decisions of the transit system's managers. Also important to
the Court, and decisive to Justice Douglas, whose vote in concurrence was
pivotal, was the need to protect the passengers, a captive audience, from
244
communications which might be offensive.
The importance of the type of forum at issue was underscored by a
second major case, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,2 45 which
concerned access to a municipal auditorium. Specifically, the road production of Hair had been barred from two theaters operated by the city of
Chatanooga because it reportedly included "nudity and obscenity."
Plaintiff-producer sought a federal decree permitting the show to go on.
The Supreme Court did not reach the substance of the obscenity issue but
did decide that the refusal to allow access to the theaters was the equivalent
of a prior restraint on speech, even though no effort had been made by the
city to bar Hair from private theaters within its jurisdiction. Prior restraint,
the Court noted, could be imposed only if the would-be censor proved the
illegality of the speech at a judicial proceeding commenced before the censorship was imposed.2 46 Of special relevance here is the Court's willingness
to equate withholding of the forum with prior restraint, thus embracing the
public forum doctrine. Lehman v. Shaker Heights247 was specifically dis-

tinguished because of the lack of a captive audience for the auditoriums.2 48
It was also distinguishable (though the Court did not bother to say so) in
that unlike commuter buses, the theaters were "public forums designed for
and dedicated to expressive activities. '249 Taken together, Lehman and
Southeastern Promotionsindicate the applicability of the public forum doctrine to ptv, as the reasons the Court gave for its refusal to apply the
doctrine to the former case cannot be fairly applied to ptv.

242 Id. at
243 Id. at

301.
302-03.

Opinion of the Court at 302-03; Opinion of Justice Douglas at 306-08.
420 U.S. 546 (1975).
246 Id. at 559-60.
247 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
248 420 U.S. at 556.
249 Id. at 555.
244
245
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250
Previously the Court has referred to the tv viewer as a captive,
though surely this is true to a lesser degree. There is more volition involved
in deciding whether to watch tv than in deciding whether or how to travel
to work. Furthermore far less is a viewer of public tv its captive than is the
"habitual" watcher of tv a captive of commercials. Having decided against
watching ptv at a given time the viewer can escape to another channel but
the viewer cannot escape the advertiser with a pervasive campaign by one
switch of the tuner. He must keep switching. Eventually he may tire out
and be captured. The disenchanted ptv viewer has only to switch once.
As to the distinction made between a forum traditionally or primarily
available for the exercise of speech and a forum only incidentally so related,
since the raison d'etre of the public broadcasting system is the communication of ideas, it cannot be said that its treatment as a forum conflicts as in
Lehman with its primary purpose. It might be argued, though, that the primary purpose of ptv is communication of selected, high-quality programs,
and that the public forum doctrine would thus be inconsistent. This argument rests on an interpretation of the Act, and it, together with several
other statutory problems relevant to the public forum doctrine, will be
2 51
treated together.
The third case in which the public forum doctrine was of concern is CBS
v. Democratic National Committee.252 This case can be read as taking a
negative view of the doctrine, for the Court refused to treat private broadcasters as a public forum even to the extent of requiring them to accept all
advertisements. The plurality opinion, resting primarily on the absence of
governmental action, 253 held as an alternative ground that the first amend-

250 The plurality opinion in CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973),
adopted the suggestion of Banzhaff v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
that a tv viewer is a captive of commercial advertisers. "[A]n ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently leaving the room,
changing the channel, or doing some other such affirmative act." 412 U.S. at 128.
251 See text accompanying notes 308-42 infra.
252412 U.S. 94 (1973).
253 412 U.S. at 97-132. The Court was divided on the issue. In the plurality
opinion, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, held that
state action was absent. They rested in part on a finding that the licensee's policy of
rejecting editorial advertising was not "fostered", id. at 118, by the government
through the FCC, although the latter had approved the policy. The Chief Justice's
opinion also noted both a significant limit to the arguably pervasive government
control over licensees and the freedom Congress left to licensees to make their own
journalistic decisions. Id. at 120. The opinion also noted that a finding of state action
would impose on the licensees the "rigid limitations" of the first amendment which
would work to limit, not broaden, their treatment of important public issues. Id. at
121. See also Justice Douglas' concurring opinion. Id. at 149-50. In a separate
opinion, Justice White refrained from deciding the question but noted that:
... it is at least arguable, and strongly so, that the Communications Act
and the policies of the Commission, including the Fairness Doctrine, are
here sufficiently implicated to require review of the Commission's
orders under the First Amendment.
Id. at 146. Likewise, Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Powell, did not decide the
issue. id. at 148.
In dissent, Justices Brennan and Marshall argued strenuously that state action
was involved. They relied on a number of indicia, including the use of a public
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ment did not require the relief sought.2 54 Some of the arguments used to
support this result might weigh as well against the use of the public forum
doctrine as to the issues involving CPB and PBS, but at the core of the CBS
decision is a belief that broadcasters should not be subjected to any additional regulation of their own speech, 255 a belief which dictates the applicability of the public forum doctrine to ptv.
In writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Burger relied in part on the
FCC's approval of the defendant's policy.2 56 He urged that the agency's
expertise and its long efforts to achieve a delicate balance among competing
users were entitled to great weight. 257 It might be argued that a similar
argument applies to CPB as it too is charged by Congress with the responsibility of developing a communications system, but there the parallel ends,
for Congress has nowhere given CPB (or PBS) the power to regulate broadcast speech. Secondly, the agency discretion here under question concerns
the limits of its own powers to control content. Given the seemingly
unavoidable tendency of institutions to maximize their spheres of influence
it is unsound to presume agency correctness on that issue. The disinterestedness which ought to underly the decision is simply lacking.
Another point made in the opinion was that the forum under attack, the
broadcasters, had an affirmative duty to present conflicting views on issues
of public importance springing from the fairness doctrine. The desirability of
requiring them to accept ads from all comers was therefore attenuated. 25
"[W]hat is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything
worth saying shall be said. '2 9 Again, CPB is under a mandate to insure
that ptv programming will be obtained from "diverse sources, '260 and will
strictly adhere to "objectivity and balance in all programs or series of programs of a controversial nature. '2 1 Do these requirements, like the
fairness doctrine, insure that CPB will fund and distribute programs so
that everything that should be said, is said? (There is no exemption for ptv
stations from the fairness requirement, and this aspect of the CBS reasoning should be applicable to the ptv stations though not to CPB and PBS.)
The issue has never been judicially determined, but CPB has taken the
position that it is not subject to any affirmative duty to fund or distribute

resource (the airwaves), and close regulation through governmental approval of
the specific policy at issue. Id. at 172-81. The test, they thought,
• . .depends not on any formalistic "private-public" dichotomy but,
rather, upon more functional considerations concerning the extent of
governmental involvement in, and public character of, a particular
"private" enterprise.
Id. at 172. In sum, only four Justices could conclude that no state action was present
in CBS.
254 412 U.S. at 129-30.
255 Id. at 120-21.
2

56Id. at 122-23.
57Id. at 117.
258Id. at 124.
2
59Id. at 122.
26047 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970).
2

26147 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970).
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public affairs programming. 262 Given this position, the analogy to the
fairness doctrine must fail.
At several points the Chief Justice in CBS stressed his concern that
adoption of the plaintiffs' position would lead to new limits on broadcaster
freedom. 263 He noted that requests to air editorial advertising might be so
numerous that resulting diminution of available air time would cause "a
further erosion of the journalistic discretion of broadcasters in the coverage
of public issues ....",264 He also saw a related problem in the likelihood
that the FCC would have to promulgate additional regulations to govern
the broadcasters' allocation of their limited time for advertising, involving
"the risk of an enlargement of government control over the content of
265
broadcast discussion of public issues."
The central question before the Court, as put by the Chief Justice, was
"who shall determine what issues are to be discussed by whom, and
when. '266 The plurality opinion left no doubt that the broadcaster, subject
only to the requirements of the fairness doctrine, had both the power and
the responsibility. If the freedom of the broadcaster is to remain the focus
of any first amendment inquiry then protection of the ptv stations from
program control by CPB or PBS seems a worthy goal. Furthermore, two
of the concurring Justices raised the public forum doctrine in a manner
which left no doubt about their view of its applicability here. 267 Assuming
then, the continued vitality of the public forum doctrine, prior to urging
its legislative imposition we must analyze its potential impact on each of the
three forums which make up the ptv system: program production funds,
268
the interconnection, and the ptv stations.
262 Brief of CPB in support of motion to dismiss the complaint, Network Project v.
CPB, 398 F. Supp. 1332 (D.D.C. 1975).
263 412 U.S. at 124, 126-27.
264 Id. at 124.
265 Id. at 126.
266 Id. at 130.
267 In what was assuredly dictum, Justice Douglas said,
Public broadcasting, of course, raises quite different problems from
those tendered by the TV outlets involved in this litigation....
If these cases involved [CPB], we would have a situation comparable
to that in which the United States owns and manages a prestigious
newspaper like the New York Times, Washington Post, or Sacramento Bee. The Government as owner and manager would not, as I
see it, be free to pick and choose such news items as it desired. For by

the First Amendment it may not censor or enact or enforce any other
"law" abridging freedom of the press. Politics, ideological slants, rightist or leftist tendencies could play no part in its design of programs. ...
More specifically, the programs tendered by the respondents in the
present cases could not then be turned down.
412 U.S. at 149-50.
Justice Stewart picked up the point:
Were the Government really operating the electronic press, it would,
as my Brother Douglas points out, be prevented by the First Amendment from selection of broadcast content and the exercise of editorial
judgment.
412 U.S. at 143.
268 Even a rejection of the doctrine by the courts would not prevent Congress from

FALL

1975]

Government Influence in Public TV
V.

OUTLINE OF A

PTV

STRUCTURE MODELED ON

THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE

Under our proposed model, CPB and PBS would be divested of all editorial power. Programming funds would go directly from CPB to the ptv
stations, each of which could use its funds locally or pool them with other
stations to produce national programs. PBS would be barred from selecting
programs for the interconnection on the basis of content and would likewise
be barred from editing any programs distributed over it. The ptv stations
would be provided with the technological capability of editing all programs
distributed to them, and they would have the authority and the repsonsibility to edit the material broadcast by them. The result would be a diffusion
of authority which would make attempts to control the content of the entire
system less likely to occur and less likely to succeed when attempted.
A. Program Production Funds Under the
Public Forum Doctrine
Though no case dealing with fund allocation has been found, the underlying logic of the doctrine calls for its imposition when the government
allocates funds intended to facilitate communication. 269 We must recognize,
however, that special difficulties will arise with regard to fund allocation not
ordinarily present when physical facilities are at stake because of the flood
of potential users. 270 It would not do to adopt a simplistic solution such as
a first come-first served rule, or a lottery of some kind because of the likelihood that the resulting programs would be so uneven as to threaten the
continuation of federal funds by eliminating a political base for it. Such
systems also fly in the face of CPB's statutory obligations to seek program
quality and balance. 27 1 This problem may be solved by directly allocating
program production funds to the stations themselves, thus taking CPB out
of the decision-making process. Either of the two systems already used to
distribute some CPB funds to the stations, unearmarked Community
Service Grants 272 or grants to the Station Program Cooperative, 273 could be
expanded to meet this requirement.
Divesting CPB of editorial power over programs it funds is feasible but
raises the question whether the Act would be violated thereby. Because of

implementing it. The discussion of case law has shown that the value of the doctrine
has been recognized in other situations in which freedom from government control
was desired.
269 Professor Emerson has concluded that the first amendment does pose such
limits on expenditures:
In general these limitations would be the same as in the case of the
government furnishing physical facilities: there could be no discrimination between users and no regulation of content.
T. EMERSON, supra note 231, at 651.
270 Id. at 652.
271 See text accompanying notes 78-80 supra.
272 These are grants made directly to ptv stations. See note 117 supra.
273 See text accompanying notes 124-27 supra.
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the complexity of the relationship between the Act and the forum doctrine
274
we shall hold our discussion of the issue for the present.
B. The Interconnection as a Public Forum
PBS uses government funds to operate the interconnection for PBS'
primary purpose, the communication of ideas. 275 In that sense the interconnection is so similar to the traditional forums that the public
forum doctrine may be relevant. If the doctrine were not to apply to the
interconnection, officials imbued with government power and subject to
government influence could decide which ideas to distribute and in what
form. 27 6 On the other hand, PBS is a membership organization composed

of the ptv stations, 277 and since it will be argued that the first amendment
is not offended by allowing the individual stations to exercise editorial
discretion, 27 8 is it not inconsistent to take a contrary view as to PBS itself?
The distinction between individual stations and PBS finds support in the
reasoning of cases such as Avins v. Rutgers,279 which upheld the power of
government to create communications media which retain editorial discretion so long as the existence of the medium in a form appropriate to its
purposes would be impossible if it did not enjoy that power. As a practical
matter, the stations could not operate very long without it, but PBS certainly could. The distinction also makes sense given the underlying policy
problem with which we are here concerned, federal control of a national
medium. Finally, there is considerable support for making such a distinction
in CBS v. Democratic National Committee.280
Before public forum rules can be imposed, however, the problem of
overwhelming demand must be considered. Assuming a demand for use
exceeding capacity, is there a rational basis for sorting requests without
yielding forum principles? This can in part be achieved by allocating interconnection time according to program source. Categorizing by originating
source, there are three types of programs for which interconnection time
might be sought: programs chosen and funded by the stations collectively,
as through the Station Program Cooperative; programs chosen and funded
by an individual station; and programs chosen and funded by a private
donor or by some other government agency.
Logically all programs funded through a station election system like the
Station Program Cooperative 2s1 should have the first claim on interconnection use. Since the original decision to produce the program with

See text accompanying notes 317-21 infra.
See text accompanying notes 109-15 supra.
276 See text accompanying notes 161-81 supra.
277 See notes 114-15 supra.
278 See text accompanying notes 284-96 infra.
279 385 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968). See note 227
and accompanying text supra.
280 412 U.S. 94 (1973). See text accompanying notes 252-67 supra.
281 See text accompanying notes 124-28 supr-.
274
275
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government funds is constitutional there is no problem in imposing a
concomitant obligation to distribute it. A failure to do so would lead to the
absurd result that much of the public would be unable to view the program
despite a national decision to produce it. Assuming further that collectively
funded programs would not exhaust interconnection resources, its managers must choose among programs in the remaining two categories.
Neither category is entitled to automatic precedence. The origin of the
program tells us nothing about key factors such as quality, likely audience
interest, and overlap with other programs scheduled for distribution, which
would govern individual broadcaster decisions to use the material. Privately funded programming might run the gamut from a big-name
dramatization of an important play to the author's home movies. Some
private programming might be of greater interest to the ptv broadcasters
as a whole than a local production by one of their own number, even if
produced with Act funds.
We suggest that the solution is to allow the stations themselves to govern
the interconnection so long as they do it directly. Descriptions of proposed
or completed programs could be regularly distributed to all of the ptv
stations so that they could indicate a preference. Programs would be
distributed according to the response. No station would necessarily be
deprived of a program it wished to broadcast for if it were not obtainable
via the interconnection a copy could be obtained directly from the producer.
A byproduct of this approach is that the catalogue of available programs
will enhance the diversity of public broadcast sources by allowing producers
and broadcasters to work together efficiently. If each station has the
28 2
capacity to operate independently of the interconnection, as we urge,
then none will be forced to broadcast a program against its wishes.
The suggested approach to the interconnection is admittedly more cumbersome than that now in use. Centralized decision making is always more
efficient, but the dangers of centralism here outweigh its utility. One type of
programming, however, might require the delegation of emergency authority to PBS or some other central entity (possibly an executive committee of
stations): public events which arise suddenly and which are of such widespread interest that ordinary programs ought to be preempted. Such
occasions should be rare and the delegation of appropriate authority to
PBS officers would therefore be less offensive.
Needless to say, PBS would be prohibited by the forum doctrine from
editing as well as selecting the interconnected programs. Since the Act
imposes no obligation on PBS to answer for program quality there should
28 3
be little objection to the loss of this type of control.
See text accompanying note 309 infra.
PBS officials have argued that their control over content is important in upholding the integrity of the ptv system. See, e.g., statement of PBS President Gunn
at note 213 supra. However, if each station had the independent capacity to preview
and edit its own programming, no reason appears why PBS need assume that responsibility and the power that goes with it.
282
283
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C. PTV Stations as Public Forums
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee2 8 4 the Court concluded that
a commercial broadcast licensee is in no sense a public forum 285 although
conceivably the result would have been different if the defendants had been
ptv stations. The problem as to whether governmental action existed, which
gave rise to such difficulty in CBS, 2 8 6 would then seem clear-cut since many
ptv stations are literally state agencies. 28 7 Many others receive substantial
state monetary support in addition to their federal funds. 288 Almost surely,
though, the public forum doctrine should be deemed inapplicable to the
individual stations even if state action is present. The full imposition of the
doctrine would eliminate all editing of the stations' product which would
threaten the very existence of the medium. The elimination would ill serve
the first amendment and, as in the case of the state university journal,
editorial power should therefore be tolerated. Of course, other devices
could be used to insulate ptv stations from state control such as judicial
review of interference by state officials and the use of boards not appointed
by or directly responsible to the state.
Another alternative might be to impose a limited public forum obligation,
by requiring that a given number of hours per week be allocated to citizen
access. It is unlikely that even this minimum could be required under the
authority of CBS. All of the considerations cited by the Court in support
of the substantive result in CBS 289 apply as much to the public stations as
to private once we accept the applicability of the legal fiction used to support editorial discretion in other state supported media.
Another factor against finding forum status for local stations is that
access to ptv broadcast time does not take the form of advertisements but
of editorial programming. This has both legal and practical consequences.
Stations would be giving up air time without any consideration. Their
efforts to develop public financial support through contributions 290 would
be jeopardized by "inferior" broadcast product, particularly if the public
access programs used prime time. 291 Alternatively, if only off hours were
turned over to the public, the purpose of public access would be little
served. These problems have no doubt contributed to the development of
the law relating to state-supported print media. Several cases have held that
government-supported publications may not discriminate among adver-

412 U.S. 94 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 252-67 supra.
286 See notes 213, 253 supra.
287 See note 16 supra. See also Canby, supra note 213, at 1159.
288 See note 18 supra. See also 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 51-52.
289 See text accompanying notes 252-67 supra.
293 The ptv stations are increasingly relying on donations from the general public.
See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 1, at 74.
291 It could arguably work the other way. For example, people might be more
generous in supporting a station which gave air time to the public generally. To the
author's knowledge no ptv station has done this and it therefore appears that the
stations believe that it would not help raise money.
284

285
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tisers 2 92 but the power to reject material submitted for inclusion as editorial
matter has been upheld.2 93 Given the similar underlying consideration,
state-supported broadcast stations should be treated similarly.
Nonetheless, the first amendment has an indispensable role in relation
to all state-supported media. Its role is to protect those charged with the
day-to-day editorial power from sporadic interference by administrative
officials 294-interference that is as likely to occur at the state or local level
as it is nationally.2 95 The judicial power to protect against extraneous interference is fortunately well-established.2 96 Were this safeguard not available
the validity of all state-supported media would be questionable.
D. The Effect of Long Term Funding on the
Need for a Public Forum Approach
Had Congress provided long term funding,2 97 adequate in amount, or
were it to do so in the future, the urgency of the public forum approach
would arguably be diminished because the responsiveness of the managers
of the ptv system to the breezes of government would be reduced. Admitting
the force of this point, nonetheless, no long-range funding bill that is likely
to be enacted would provide a degree of insulation which would make other
structural changes unnecessary. Weaknesses in the Public Broadcasting
Financing Act of 1974298 exemplify this problem. This bill would establish
a public broadcasting fund within the Treasury and would authorize and
appropriate to the fund sums for each of the five years commencing July
1, 1975.299 The amount authorized for each year would depend upon a
matching formula subject to specific ceilings.3 00 The appropriation for each
of the five years would be available to CPB, provided that specified percentages are distributed to the broadcasting stations, which are free to use
292 Lee v. Board of Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971); Radical Lawyers v.
Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
293 See notes 226-35 and accompanying text supra.
294

id.

295 See note 223 supra.
296 See text accompanying notes 226-35 supra.
297 See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra.
298 S. 3825, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
299 ld. § 1.
300 The authorization would equal 40 percent of the total nonfederal funds received by all "public broadcasting entities" during the second preceding fiscal year.
Id. "Public broadcasting entities" are defined to include CPB, the public broadcasting stations and "any nonprofit institution engaged primarily in the production, acquisition, distribution, or dissemination of educational television and radio programs."
Id. § 4. The amount could in no event exceed maxima rising from $70 million in
the first year to $100 million in the fifth year. Id. § 1. No change in these figures was
made in the 1975 revision of the bill. Hearings on H.R. 4563, supra note 11.
There would apparently be little difficulty in raising the nonfederal support needed
to reach the federal levels at which the maxima would become operative. In 1973
the reported nonfederal income was $199 million. Testimony of Joseph D. Hughes,
Chairman of Long-Range Financing Task Force and Member of the CPB Board,
1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 11, at 61.
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them to finance their broadcasting activities. 301
By authorizing and appropriating public broadcasting funds for a fiveyear period, the bill would free its officials from the need to return to
Congress and the Executive annually to seek funds. This would certainly
reduce the capacity of those branches to influence the ptv decision-makers.
Hopefully, the freedom would filter throughout the entire system and be
felt by producers and broadcasters as well. Although the knowledge that
the government must again be approached at the end of the five-year period
will dampen somewhat the freeing effect of the bill, five years is a relatively
long time in the perspective of broadcasting, and a flap over a given
program would probably subside by the time the government must once
again act on public broadcasting. Of course, one can imagine without too
much effort a long-running program series becoming an issue and remaining
so if still on the air during the fifth year. Similarly, allegations of overall
program direction may well become an issue as it has in the past. 30 2 Also
dampening any new sense of freedom is a pointed reminder in the bill that
CPB officers and directors must be available to testify before Congress
annually. 30 3 It is to be expected and hoped that Congress will not see fit
to exercise the procedure, but its inclusion will no doubt be taken by CPB
and PBS as a warning against boat rocking.
Since even the enactment of the Public Broadcasting Financing Act of
1974 would not lead to the permanent separation of funding from the
political process seen by the Carnegie Commission and others as a condition
for independence,30 4 the centralization of power over program content in
the agencies most subject to political pressure must remain an area of
concern. The bill also addresses this problem but in only a limited way, by
requiring CPB to distribute a minimum percentage of its federal funds
directly to the stations. 30 5 By relieving some of the flow of funds to the stations from the attachment of strings by CPB this provision should
strengthen the independence of the former. Under the bill, though, CPB
would continue to control at least some program production funds. Further,
the projected funding level would not be sufficient to enable the production
of enough national programs to give the stations a meaningful opportunity
301 The percentage of the funds CPB receives under the bill which it must distribute
to the stations varies with the dollar amount it receives from the Treasury. The
distributed amount must be not less than 40 percent of the funds received when
they total $70 to $90 million, 45 percent when they total $90 to $100 million, and
50 percent when the total reaches $100 million. S. 3825, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 1
(1974). The recipient stations are expressly permitted to use the funds to produce or
otherwise acquire programs. Id.
302 See text accompanying notes 181-213 supra. As Senator Baker put it at the
recent Senate Hearings: "[T]here is nothing that says that the Congress that giveth
cannot taketh away. And it can. And it can at anytime." 1974 Senate Hearings,supra
note 11, at 15. The possibility will no doubt shape the thinking of the system's
managers.
303 S. 3825, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (1973).
304 See text accompanying notes 94-100 supra.
30
5See note 301 and accompanying text supra.
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to exercise a choice reflecting local interests 306 nor would local stations get
enough money to afford the technical equipment needed to free them from
dependence on the PBS schedule.30 7 Finally, the bill in no way resolves the
problem of editorial control of the interconnection by PBS and CPB.
VI.

THE PUBLIC FORUM ALTERNATIVE APPROACH IN

RELATION TO THE PUBLIC BROADCASTING ACT OF

1967

One of the conclusions of this article is that legislative imposition of the
public forum doctrine on CPB and PBS is desirable. 308 This recommended
reform-is not inconsistent with the Act as originally adopted. Although the
intent of Congress was that the local stations should themselves control the
content and scheduling of their programming, 30 9 this has to some degree
been frustrated by the CPB-PBS control over program funding 310 and the
interconnection. 31' As has been demonstrated, there are alternatives to the
present system under which CPB and PBS would be prevented from exercising control over program content. 31 2 In fairness to the architects of the
system currently in use, however, it must be admitted that in several ways
313
their design is more expedient than the suggested decentralized plan.
To begin with, the limited funds available for program production would
mean that some programs, and especially a series of programs, would be
306 Representatives of ptv claim that the funds to be provided under the Public
Broadcasting Act of 1974 will be grossly insufficient. See 1974 Senate Hearings,
supra note 11, at 71-84.
307 Id. See also statement of Joseph Hughes, id. at 60, in which Congress is urged
to make an additional expenditure for capital improvements.
308 See text accompanying note 343 infra.
309 Congressional desire that the local ptv stations were to exercise primary authority over public broadcasting was expressed most directly in 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(l)(D)
(1970), which required CPB to
carry out its purposes and functions and engage in its activities in ways
that will -most effectively assure the maximum freedom of the noncommercial educational television or radio broadcast systems and
local stations from interference with or control of program content
or other activities.
See also 47 U.S.C. §§ 396(a)(2)-(4), 396(g)(1)(B), 396(g)(2)(C)-(G), 396(g)(3) (1970).
See also text accompanying notes 78-93 supra.
310 See text accompanying notes 116-28 supra.
311 See text accompanying notes 129-60 supra. In 1972 PBS "basic scheduled
service" consisted of twenty-five hours of programming per week transmitted on a
schedule which allowed the stations to broadcast it as received. In addition, special
programs were also transmitted. Public Broadcasting Service, 1973 Hearings, supra
note 110, at 412-13.
312 See text accompanying notes 268-69 supra.
313 Hartford N. Gunn, Jr., PBS President, has made a detailed presentation of
program-funding alternatives which would transfer control over program selection
to the ptv stations. See Gunn, Public Television Program Financing, appendix to
1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 442. The article does not, however, suggest
means for decentralizing control over distribution, although it discusses the problems which might be caused by decentralizing the program selection process. The
article also mentions loss of concentrated purchasing power, possible loss of local
financial support as federal funds increase, and a loss of creativity due to the need
to reach compromise decisions. Id. at 451-53.
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beyond the reach of any individual station. Unless a pooling system were
developed, which would, however, be expensive both in time and money,
some important series may not be able to be produced. The Station Program Cooperative is proof that fund-pooling systems are a realistic
314
alternative, but is also proof that the alternatives may be complex.
Second, any system which requires that the ptv stations tape programs in
advance (which they would have to do if PBS could no longer edit content)
would involve several new expenses. There would be the cost of the videotape itself, the added costs due to staff expansion needed for program
monitoring, and the capital investment for recording equipment. Since
each of these costs must be borne by every station the total burden on the
national system could be considerably above the current ptv funding
315
level.
The fiscal advantages of the present system do not necessarily establish
its appropriateness but there is evidence of an effort to conserve limited
resources, an effort which is also arguably supported by the Act's concern
with quality programming. 316 Since money spent on administration is not
available for program production, the quality of the latter may suffer. The
pull of these conflicting goals on the system colors each facet of our discussion of statutory amendment.
A. Content-Based Allocation of Program
Production Funds by CPB
The problem of CPB's control over programming funds calls for the
resolution of a related but more complex conflict within the Act itself.
There is a tension between those provisions which apparently grant CPB
authority to decide how to distribute program production funds and those
provisions which require CPB to protect the independence of the local
stations. This tension has been stretched to the breaking point by fund
shortages which dictate local station acceptance of CPB-chosen pro317
gramming.
CPB has a specific grant of authority to fund program production by
grants to individual producers, production entities, or ptv stations. 318
Additionally, one of the purposes for which CPB was created was to
"facilitate the full development of educational broadcasting in which programs of high quality will b. made available . . . with strict adherence to

314

Id.

The cost of the necessary technical equipment has been estimated at $17
million. AUTHORIZATION FOR PUBLIC BROADCASTING, S. REP. No. 123, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (1973). Hartford N. Gunn, Jr., PBS President, estimated the cost at $20-25
million. 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 136. Gunn estimated the added annual
(noncapital) cost as $20-30 million. Id.
316 Congress intended public broadcasting to "constitute an expression of diversity
and excellence." 47 U.S.C. § 396(a)(4) (1970). Further, it intended that programs
of "high quality" be produced by the ptv system. 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970).
315

317 See text accompanying notes 130-33 supra.
31847

U.S.C. §§ 396(g)(2)(B)-(C) (1970).

FALL

1975]

Government Influence in Public TV

objectivity and balance ....

.,319 Together these sections arguably imply,

though they do not specifically grant, the power to choose programs according to CPB's judgment as to type and quality-the power to make
content-based decisions. The opposite inference may be drawn, however,
from those sections designed to promote localism, particularly the general
limit placed on CPB to "assure the maximum freedom of the . . . local

stations from interference with or control of program content or other
activities.

320

The problem is complicated by the fact that most stations must, as a
practical matter, broadcast that which CPB has chosen. 321 Due to overall
monetary limitations the stations do not enjoy freedom of choice. 322 Currently only one program is transmitted over the interconnection to the ptv
stations for each time slot and unless the station has other programming
available to it, which is as a general rule unlikely, the only choice is to use
the CPB program or to go off the air. The limitation on local station freedom is all the more serious because they cannot, in most cases, preview the
programs prior to transmittal.
Loss of control over production funds would not deprive CPB of all
means of promoting quality programs. Quality control can be achieved by
such indirect means as serving as a clearinghouse for producers with proposed projects, by publicizing within the ptv system those programs which
are especially successful, and by maintaining an effectively operated library
of programs. In short, CPB could provide leadership without assuming dictatorship, benevolent or otherwise. Arguably, loss of content control also
would impair CPB's power to enforce the objectivity and balance requirement. This should not concern Congress if, as seems likely, its purpose in
enacting the requirement was to protect the local stations from domination
by an ideological CPB.323 By making CPB's politics irrelevant to program

selection, the forum approach performs the same task better. If the purpose
31947 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(A) (1970).
32047

U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(D) (1970).

The legislative history indicates that Congress did not anticipate the degree of
control that CPB's program funding power would give it because the assumption
in 1967 was that there would eventually be enough programs produced to ensure free
choice on the part of each station. The Senate Commerce Committee Report, for
example, states,
[t]he Corporation will assist in making programs available to stations,
but the determination of what programs will be broadcast remains with
the stations themselves. Individual stations, therefore, retain the responsibility to assess community needs and determine what programs
will best meet those needs .... Local autonomy of stations and diversity of program sources will provide operational safeguards to assure the
democratic functioning of the system.
S. REP. No. 222, supra note 52, at 1778-79. Diverse program choice was also one of
the goals the Carnegie Commission set for ptv. See text accompanying note 33 supra.
Leaders of the PBS system testified in the 1973 ptv hearings that genuine local
control could not be realized without a large increase in the number of programs
available and the means to choose among them. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 110,
at 122-36.
322 See text accompanying note 342 in/ra.
323 See text accompanying note 88 supra.
321
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was to protect the public against the ideology of any given ptv station, the
fairness doctrine will serve as well. These facts argue strongly that the
Act's basic purposes do not require the vesting of power over content in
CPB.
B. Program Distribution and Editing
As with program financing, central control of program distribution facilitates and even invites government attempts to influence program
content. 32 4 By eliminating the CPB-PBS powers which contribute to central
control the forum doctrine would again further the congressional quest for
local control.
CPB is prohibited from owning or operating any ptv "station, system or
network ... 325 This provision was intended to prevent CPB from exercising "operative authority over . . . interconnection facilities .... -326 and it
thus contributes to the localist structure of the Act. The outside observer
cannot know whether CPB uses its funds to control PBS policies, but the
observer can analyze the CPB-PBS partnership agreement under which the
two corporations share the power8 to develop a schedule 327 and to bar pro32
grams from the interconnection.
Under the terms of the agreement CPB only shares power and has no
right to veto PBS decisions. 329 However, because CPB is the source of funds
which PBS uses to operate the interconnections its voice may prove more
equal than its partner's. 330 Thus, to insulate the interconnection from central control it would be necessary to limit CPB's management.
Removing governance of the CPB from the interconnection would limit
government intrusion but could not totally insulate program content so
long as PBS itself could control it, because PBS is also subject to federal
331
influence.
Congressional authorization for the establishment of an interconnection 332 indicates that it has chosen the development of the interconnection
333
as the most efficient means for the distribution of the available programs.
However, Congress has also recognized the danger that a mechanical system of distribution might become an instrument of control. To foreclose
129-60 and accompanying text supra.
§ 396(g)(3) (1970).
H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1809. See also S.

324 See notes
325 47 U.S.C.
326

REP.

No. 222, supra

note 52, at 1782.

327 Joint Resolution, supra note 109.

329

Id.
Id.

330

The views of Senators Baker, Cotten, and Griffin are: "CPB calls many of the

328

tunes when it pays the PBS piper." S. REP. No. 92-892, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1972).
331 See text accompanying notes 165-81 supra. Although PBS is an entity composed
of the local stations and largely governed by them, this conclusion is not affected by
that because the localism requirement cannot be satisfied by a delegation of authority
to PBS management.
332 47 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(B) (1970).
333 This view had earlier been expressed by the Carnegie Commission. See note 41
supra.
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this possibility the statutory language itself insists on local control over
the materials actually broadcast. CPB was authorized to
assist in the . . . establishment . . . of one or more systems of

interconnection to be used for the distribution of educational
television.., programs so that all [ptv] stations that wish
334to may
broadcast the programs at times chosen by the stations.
As has been noted, the local stations are theoretically but not in reality free
to choose whether and when to broadcast. 335 Rather than promoting their
responsibility to serve their communities, the current system of interconnection promotes a national orientation.
As PBS administers the interconnection, the programs chosen and edited
by both PBS and CPB are transmitted on a fixed schedule and organized
with the expectation that the ptv stations will broadcast the programs directly as they are received.336 Were programs transmitted on a schedule not
reflecting expected broadcast schedules, the local station would be forced
to preview each program in order to make its own schedule and could
realistically accept responsibility for what it chose to broadcast. 337 Yet,
many local stations apparently approve of the present structure, 338 and one
congressional committee, after a review of the ptv system, voiced approval. 339 A similar reason may be the foundation of the approval by both:
a shortage of funds.
Through most of the Act's history the legislators most enthusiastic about
ptv have been confronted with executive and congressional resistance to
substantial increments in funding. 340 Unable to provide money necessary to
operate a truly localized system, Congress has been in no position to insist
33447 U.S.C. § 396(g)(1)(B) (1970).
According to the House Report, this
language
emphasizes a fundamental concept that runs throughout title IIlocalism: local stations shall retain both the opportunity and responsibility for broadcasting programs they feel best serve their communities.

•

.

. Even with respect to live simultaneous broadcasts, local stations

will have the discretion to decide if such programs will be carried at
the time the Corporation has arranged for their transmission, at some
other time, or not at all.
H.R. REP. No. 572, supra note 52, at 1808.
335 See text accompanying note 131 supra and note 342 inlra. See also 1973
Hearings, supra note 110, at 123.
336 See text accompanying note 131 supra. See also note 311 supra.
337 Of course, if the only programs transmitted were those chosen by CPB the

local station would still have only a Hobson's choice. See testimony of Hartford N.
Gunn, Jr., 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 136-37.

338 See testimony of William Harley, Chairman, National Association of Educational Broadcasters, 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 126.
339 S. REP. No. 93-123, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1973).
340 This is a matter of interpretation. Clay T. Whitehead, then Director of the
Office of Telecommunications Policy, pointed out in 1973 that the Nixon administration supported an increase in funding from $5 million in 1969 to $45 million requested for 1974. 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 86. Yet at that hearing he was,
as the administration spokesman, opposed to the amounts sought in S. 1090, which
were $55 million for fiscal 1974 and $75 million for fiscal 1975. He argued that $45
million would be sufficient and that any authorization should be limited to one year.
Id. at 85-93.
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on one. Furthermore, to urge an overhaul at a time when popular programs
are themselves threatened or eliminated due to lack of funds would be
politically difficult. 341 The ptv stations are in a similar bind. How can they
assert need for independence when they lack the means to pay for the costs
it would entail? Until the money is available for the equipment and personnel necessary to enable them to tape, preview, and rebroadcast all
transmitted programs, they will continue to desire a fixed schedule interconnection. 342 The problem of the stations and of Congress in part reflects
the conflict between program quality and principles of localism with which
our statutory discussion began. One solution which suggests itself is a
legislative mandate to reorganize coupled with an increase in funding intended to make the changes more palatable to the system's managers.
Congress should face its fiscal responsibilities to its creation at the same
time that it insists on ptv ordering its own house. Each requirement relies
to some extent upon the achievement of the other. If ptv were to order its
own house it may well facilitate adequate funding since it would allay the
fears of those who see in ptv the Orwellian spectre. However, to provide
the funds without achieving the reorganization here outlined would scarcely
provide the dreams of freedom in broadcasting in which the system
originated.
VII. CONCLUSION

This article has resisted the temptation to evaluate the editorial content
of the ptv system, as it has been the system itself which was of concern.
Nonetheless, the content, and the potential future content, of the medium
admittedly contributes substantially to one basic conclusion: federally
funded television deserves our encouragement as well as our critical
341 1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 14, 25, 35.
342 The problem was pinpointed during the testimony of Ralph B. Rogers, Chairman of the PBS Board of Governors, at the 1973 Senate hearings on public broadcasting:
Senator Cook: And the original intention, then, as I understand it,.
was that the interconnection was to be used somewhere in the nature
of a library service, that you could continue to feed programming,
you could continue to feed things to stations, you could set up a
schedule, so to speak, if a station wanted to pick you up on the interconnection for a particular program, it could; if it didn't want that
program, then it didn't have to video tape and utilize it at a later date,
but it was to be like a wire service, it could be five paragraphs long,
but you could take two sentences out of it for a 5-minute news program. Was that the intent of the interconnection?
Mr. Rogers: Yes, it was. What we have today is we have the situation
where there are perhaps 25 percent of the stations in the country who
can use the interconnection service in the way in which it was originally
intended and we have 75 percent who can't.
But we must be realistic, we live in the real world, and the fact is that
it is a lot cheaper to tape programs, let us say, like "Sesame Street"
and "The Electric Company" and transmit as if it were a network than
it is to do it any other way. .. . I submit to you that we should recognize the real facts of life and that we should keep in mind what we want
in the way of an interconnection service until we can afford it.
1973 Hearings, supra note 110, at 126.
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watchfulness. Although it has often been indistinguishable from its commercial competitors, ptv has more than occasionally given us television
of value which would hardly have come to pass without it. Unless pay tv
or other new systems develop, the alternative to government financed and
influenced television will continue to be commercially financed and dominated television. If the one has limits, so too has the other. In part, ptv has
value because it marches to a different drummer. Yet to ignore the reality
of government influence on the ptv system scarcely serves the interests of
viewers and system alike.
If the influence of government cannot be eliminated it can and should be
minimized. The introduction of the Public Broadcasting Financing Act of
1974 represents a modest advance along these lines. Despite its limitations
and even if the amendments suggested below are not adopted, the bill, if
reintroduced, should be enacted because of the insulation from the government that it adds to the public broadcasting structure. That insulation would
further be improved if the bill were amended along the following lines: (1)
All power over program selection should be placed in the hands of public
broadcasting licensees, who should, however, remain free to combine their
resources and fund programs jointly so long as they do not delegate that
function to any central body; (2) PBS or any successor manager of the
interconnection should be prohibited from selecting or editing programs;
(3) the amounts authorized and appropriated should be increased sub343
stantially.
By decentralizing the ptv system Congress will be reducing its own power
to influence ptv programming. To ask Congress to give up power at the
same time it provides increased funds may seem impolitic, but that goes to
the core of our approach. The normal principle of government under
which responsibility to Congress flows from the use of federal funds has
little place with regard to ptv programming. This does not mean that ptv
stations will be accountable to no one. As are all television stations they are
accountable to the FCC344 and the communities they serve. 345 Given the
increasing reliance on public fund-raising, 346 ptv community accountability
will be greater than that of commercial stations. Rather than insisting on
primary accountability to itself, Congress should encourage ptv's accountability to its consumers, the viewers. A recent amendment to the Freedom
of Information Act may be a good beginning if, as it appears to do, it makes
343 Conflicting estimates of the cost of decentralizing the ptv system are difficult
for an observer to reconcile. See, e.g., note 315 supra. Thus no dollar figures can b2
stated here.
344 Licenses for ptv stations, like all other tv licenses, are renewable only by the
FCC. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
345 Licenses may be renewed only if "public convenience, interest, or necessity
" 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (1970). The Commission recently
will be served thereby ..
decided not to renew the license of the Alabama Educational Television System,
which operates eight ptv stations, because of racially discriminatory hiring and programming. Alabama Television Commission, 28 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 271 (1973),
designated for hearing, 23 P & F RAuio REG. 2d 800, 33 F.C.C. 2d 495, FCC 74-1385,
29210, N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 8. (not officially reported).
346 See note 290 supra.
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that Act applicable to CPB. 347 More fundamentally, an adoption of those
provisions already described which would decentralize the ptv structure
would do much to subject it to viewer control, for by shifting the focus of
power from a large nationally oriented bureaucracy (which must be perceived as largely unreachable by individuals) to smaller, local entities,
Congress would encourage the participation of the people in the governance
of their medium.

347 Pursuant to Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, § 3(e), Stat. -,
amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), "any ... Government controlled corporation .
is now subject to the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. According to
H.R. REP. No. 93-876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), printed in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6203, the quoted language includes CPB. The S. CONF. REP. No.
93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), however, states that CPB is not intended to be
included. 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6221, 6229. If the Freedom of
Information Act does apply to CPB and PBS it would require them to publish in the
Federal Register, inter alia, their substantive and procedural rules and all amendments thereto. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(1)(C)-(E). Policy statements, administrative manuals, and staff instructions would be available for public inspection. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552(a)(2)(B)-(C) (1970). The public would then be able to keep informed as to
procedures or policies which might affect free speech aspects of ptv programming.

